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CATCHING DISRUPTION:
REGULATING CORPORATE VENTURE
CAPITAL
Jennifer S. Fan*
Sesame Street, Walgreens, 7-Eleven, General Motors,
Campbell Soup-these are not the names of companies that
come to mind when thinking about the startup world. Yet,
each of these companies started its own corporate venture
capital arm in the last eight years. Corporate venture capital
("CVC')-equity investments in external startups made by
corporations or
investment entities designated by
corporations-nolonger play a minor role in venture capital;
they have become an influential force in the field. Business
scholars have been at the forefront of studying this newly
powerful phenomenon. Thus far, however, legal scholars have
overlooked CVCs. Legal scholars-and many in the venture
capital community-see only two players: traditionalventure
capital firms and entrepreneurs.The failure to appreciate the
significance of CVCs as a third major player impoverishes
theoretical and practical accounts of venture capital. This
Article reframes the legal discussion of venture capital to
incorporate key shifts wrought by CVCs in areas from
corporategovernance to risk allocation.
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INTRODUCTION
Household names like Sesame Street,1 Walgreens, 2 7Eleven, 3 General Motors,4 and Campbell Soup 5 have joined

1 See Matthew Lynley, Yep, Sesame Street Now has a Venture Fund,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 1, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/01/yep-sesame-

street-now-has-a-venture-fund/ [perma.cc/5NF7-6R4U].
2 See discussion infra Section III.D and accompanying notes.
3 7-Eleven's corporate venture capital arm, 7-Ventures, began in 2010
and focuses on investments in the software industry. See 7-Ventures,
https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/profile-1884716116/
PITCHBOOK,
[perma.cc/HUW4-97NE].
4 General Motors invests directly in startups as well as through its
corporate venture capital arm, General Motors Ventures, which was
formed in 2010. See discussion infra Section III.E and accompanying
notes.
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the ranks of high tech titans such as Google and Intel in the
world of corporate venture capital ("CVC" or "corporate
venture capital"). In contrast to venture capital ("VC" or
"venture capital") firms which purely focus on financial
returns, most corporations seek strategic benefits from their
venture investments, in addition to financial returns."6
Although CVC started in the 1960s and experienced four
periods or "waves" of development, only in the past few years
has it matured into a major force, finding a central place in
the fast-evolving technology landscape that focuses on
disruptive innovation. 7 CVC now permeates every stage of
venture capital. In the race to remain innovative, larger
corporations engage in CVC endeavors to associate with and
profit from the next market disrupters.
CVCs are not mere analogs of traditional VC firms. As a
result of their position within larger corporations, CVCs
have different strategic goals and unparalleled financial and
5 Campbell Soup's newly-created venture arm (founded in 2016) is
called Acre Venture Partners. See discussion infra Subsection III.C.3 and
accompanying notes.
6 Equity,
EWING
MARION
KAUFFMAN
FOUND.,
http://www.kauffman.org/microsites/state-of-the-field/topics/finance/equity
[perma.cc/WVU6-BLW6]; see also VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING,
INVESTING

IN

BREAKTHROUGH:

CORPORATE VENTURE

CAPITAL

9

(2014),

http://www.breakthroughcapitalism.com/files/volans-investingbreakthrough-report.pdf [perma.cc/USP6-8NFT]. This differs from the goal
of venture capital funds, which aim to get extremely high returns (i.e.
homeruns) on investments made on behalf of limited partners who invest
in venture capital funds. See BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE
DEALS 115-28 (2d ed. 2013). "[CVC] is a subset of venture capital wherein
corporations make systematic investments into startup companies, often
by taking an equity stake in an innovative firm tangentially related to the
company's own industry. They often also provide marketing expertise,
management, strategic direction, and a line of credit." Jack Du, The Rise of
Corporate
Venture
Capital
(TWTR,
FB),
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/082815/rise-corporateventure-capital.asp [perma.cc/4C5A-Q7W2].
7 Clayton Christensen coined the term "disruptive innovation." Joseph
L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Innovation: Catching the
Wave, HARv. BUS. REV., Jan. 1995, at 45. See also infra note 74 (for a full
definition of disruptive innovation).
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can
from which entrepreneurs
technical resources
immensely benefit. These distinctions raise significant
business and legal issues. Thus far, however, legal scholars
have overlooked CVCs. This Article is the first to analyze
how CVC has fundamentally altered legal considerations
related to private ordering8 in the venture capital world. 9
CVC had a banner year in 2015,10 accounting for twentyfive percent of later stage deals globally.ii CVCs poured in
roughly $7.7 billion in 930 venture rounds that equated to
twenty-one percent of all deals and thirteen percent of all
venture capital dollars. 12 The sectors benefitting the most
from this influx of money were software companies,13

8 Private ordering is defined as "where transactors are autonomous
and employ extralegal mechanisms to enforce contracts . . . ." Barak D.
Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2330 (2004).
9 See discussion infra Section II.D for a more robust definition of
private ordering within the context of venture capitalism.
10 Press Release, Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Corporate Venture
Investment to Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Hits Fifteen Year High in 2015
19,
2016),
http://nvca.org/pressreleases/corporate-venture(Jan.
investment-to-entrepreneurial-ecosystem-hits-ffteen-year-high-in-2015/
[perma.cc/XJA6-LNJ6] [hereinafter NVCA, Corporate Venture Investment
Hits Fifteen Year High].
11 Rachael King, Corporate VC Investments Hold Steady amid
BroaderDownturn in Market, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (Jan. 22, 2016, 5:45 PM),
http:/blogs.wsj.com./cio/2016/01/22/corporate-vc-investments-hold-steadyamid-broader-downturn-in-market [perma.cc/B257-REA3].
12 See NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, 2016 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL
AssoCIATION YEARBOOK 94 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 NVCA YEARBOOK]. In
light of the increasing number of corporations starting CVCs, the authors
of the 2016 NVCA YEARBOOK note that corporate venture groups will
continue to invest alongside venture capital funds. See id.; see also NVCA,
Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10. In
the fourth quarter of 2015 alone, investment from corporate venture
capital amounted to "$1.2 billion in 199 deals, representing 10.3 percent of
dollars invested and 21 percent of deals for the quarter." Id.
13 "As has been the trend with overall venture investing, software
companies continue to receive the largest amount of corporate venture
dollars, drawing $2.5 billion in 389 deals in 2015, representing 32.6
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biotechnology
companies,14
and
industrial/energy
companies.15
CVCs have existed since the 1960s, but in a less
influential, embryonic, form.16 In their earlier stages of
development, CVCs tended to invest only in the later stages
of startups, and generally did not designate board members.
Now the opposite is true: corporations increasingly make
investments in the early stages of startups through their

percent of all corporate venture dollars deployed." NVCA, Corporate
Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10.
14 In the biotechnology sector, CVCs deployed $1.2 billion in 133
deals, which amounted to 16.3 percent of all CVC dollars in 2015. Id. To
highlight one example, with respect to cancer startups, "[e]xcept for a drop
in funding in 2012 (consistent with overall funding trends to this sector
that year), funding dollars from rounds involving corporate investorsincluding corporate parents and differentiated venture arms-increased
nearly five-fold, from $259M in 2011 to $1.24B in 2015." CorporateDeal
Activity in Cancer Therapeutics Startups Nearly Doubles in 2015, CB
INSIGHTS (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporateinvestors-oncology-startups/ [perma.cc/SA4Z-H2BF].
15 In the industrial/energy sector, CVCs deployed $1.2 billion in fortysix deals which amounted to 16.1% of all CVC dollars and nearly forty
percent of all venture investments in this sector in 2015. NVCA, Corporate
Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10. "[C]orporate
venture investment in industrial/energy companies continued to be overweighted as compared to overall venture investment into the sector. In
2015, corporate venture groups accounted for nearly forty percent of all
venture investment into industrial/energy companies." Id.
16 In 1968 to 1969, there were 150 CVC units but by 1973 only ten
remained. There were similar downturns in the 1980s and 1999/2000. Josh
Lerner, Professor, Harvard Bus. School, Discussion with Fan Munce at the
SHIFT
NYC
Conference
(Oct.
28,
2016),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/corporates-shift-relations-vcs-j amesmawson [perma.cc/6KBB-79ED]. Coupled with the rise of CVC is the fact
that the VC industry has consolidated. "211 U.S. firms [did] at least five
deals in a year ... versus 1,000 or more in 2000... . 60% of [venture
capital] money [is] now raised in funds being secured by the top 16 firms."
Venky Ganesan, Chairman, NVCA, Remarks at the SHIFT NYC
Conference (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/corporatesshift-relations-vcs-james-mawson [perma.cc/6KBB-79ED].
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and CVCs frequently designate board members,
heavily influencing all stages of startups receiving CVC.
CVCs are developing their own investment rhythm-one
that differs significantly from that of VC funds. Additionally,
CVCs are now investing in a broader spectrum of industries
and the parent corporations of CVCs are reallocating funds
from research and development ("R&D") to CVC activities. In
fact, CVC augments and may eventually supplant R&D due
to its increasing reach and influence. Corporate venture
capital is now a mature economic force, and it is already
changing things on the ground. Put simply, CVC is now a
major player in the innovation ecosystem.
The legal implications of CVC with respect to private
ordering have yet to be explored. In the past, legal
scholarship has focused on the role of entrepreneurs and
venture capital funds (and the limited partners who invest in
them). With the swell of CVC activity, however, the
dynamics of the private ordering system which undergirds
the venture capital landscape has changed. While legal
scholars have written extensively about venture capital, they
have overlooked this shift.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the
evolution of CVC. Part II briefly describes how private
ordering works within the venture capital context when only
startups and venture capital funds are involved. It then
analyzes the growing role and importance of CVC and its
impact on the implicit and explicit contracts made between
the startup and venture capital fund. Part III critiques the
legal issues raised by the increasing influence of CVC on
venture capital using a few prominent public companies with
CVC arms as examples. Part IV suggests possible solutions
to the challenges raised by CVCs in private ordering in the
venture capital context; specifically, the ramifications of CVC
investments for early investors (i.e., venture capital funds),
CVCs,17

THE 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT 13 (2017),
17 See CB INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-corporate-venture-capital-report2016 [hereinafter 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT] (registration required).
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employees of the startups, and founders. This Article
concludes with suggestions for future areas of study.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE VENTURE
CAPITAL: THE FOUR WAVES

Corporate venture capital has matured and evolved over
the course of a few decades. In its latest iteration, it has
become a fixture in the VC landscape, and is now a major
player in what historically has been a two-player private
ordering world. To provide context, this Article briefly
discusses the first three eras--called waves--of corporate
venture capital. It then argues how the current wave, the
fourth, marks the maturation of this new form of investment.
The evolution of corporate venture capital can be tied to
four distinct time periods, or waves.1 8 The first wave took
place in the 1960s and was concentrated in the areas of
technology and pharmaceuticals.19 When the initial public
18 There is no substantive or authoritative research about the origins
of CVCs. It is difficult to pinpoint the number of CVCs in earlier waves. In
the first wave, "[t]he prevailing spirit of American big business ... favored
large diversified corporations operating in many sectors." The History of
CVC: From Exxon and DuPont to Xerox and Microsoft, How Corporates
Began Chasing 'The Future, CB INSIGHTS
(Mar 7,
2017),
https://www.cbinsights.com/researchlreport/corporate-venture-capitalhistory/ [perma.cc/PZ5X-EQ5E] [hereinafter The History of CVC].
19 VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 20. The
traditional venture capital model drove the success of the first CVC wave,
and, "as corporations grew in size and scope in the 1960s, a need to
diversify. They focused on internal ventures or external [startups]; the
emergence of spin-out businesses benefiting from wider parent company
support was yet to come. The activity was mainly in innovation-intensive
industries such as technology and pharmaceuticals." Id. In the mid- 1960s,
corporations entered the venturing world with the goal of "generating
above-average financial returns." Falk Bielesch et al., Corporate Venture
Capitak Avoid the Risk, Miss the Rewards, BCG PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 31,
2012),
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/innovationgrowth mergers-acquisitionsscorporate venturecapital/
[perma.cc/
4WVM-N85P]. "It was a period of rapid technological advancement, robust
corporate profits, a soaring stock market, and widespread management
faith in the strategic value of diversification." Id. U.S. corporations in the
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offering ("IPO") market collapsed and the oil crisis emerged
in the 1970s, the first wave ended. 20 The second wave
occurred in the 1980s when venture capitalists re-emerged
21
due to less stringent pension fund regulations and tax cuts.
Biotechnology and technology companies received the bulk of
the investments in that time period until the market
downturn in 1987.22 The third wave took place during the
dot-com boom in the late 1990s-CVC surged again due to
the allure of riches in the Internet realm and rising stock
markets. 23 In the early 2000s, however, the bubble burst,
and CVC activity decreased substantially. 2 4 These dramatic
technology and pharmaceutical sectors invested in new ventures, but shut
down their corporate venture capital arms when the initial public offering
market collapsed in 1973. Id.
20 Bielesch et al., supra note 19.
21 Due to the loosening of pension fund regulations and tax cuts,
venture capital funds re-emerged in the 1980s and CVCs followed suit,
hoping to match the returns of traditional VC firms. Id. "CVC as a broad
theme lay dormant until the early 1980s, when a new generation of
independent venture capitalists emerged, their coffers bulging with cash
from U.S. investors taking advantage of a cut in the capital gains tax and
the relaxation of restrictions on pension fund investments." Id. As was the
case in the 1970s, the technology and pharmaceutical industries were the
most active CVC investors, but when the stock market crash of 1987
occurred, their interest faded and they "went into retreat." Id.
22 VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 21.

23 "The third CVC wave boomed in investment levels around the time
of the dotcom bubble, fueled by the seemingly limitless potential of the
Internet and rising stock markets-and fell victim to the bubble's pop in
the early 2000s." Id. It also marked the first time that European
corporations and emerging markets engaged in venture investing. Id.
24 Id. In the late 1990s, corporations invested heavily in startups until
the economic downturn. From September 2000 to September 2001,
investments in startups fell by eighty percent. Henry Chesbrough, Making
Sense of Corporate Venture Capital, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar. 2002, at 90,
101,
https:/Ihbr.org/2002/03/making-sense-of-corporate-venture-capital
[perma.cc/6HX8-LJJU]. "Quarterly corporate venture-capital investments
in [startups] rose from $468 million at the end of 1998 to $6.2 billion at the
beginning of 2000 and then tumbled to $848 million in the third quarter of
2001." Id. "The advent of the Internet in the mid-1990s heralded the
beginning of the third CVC cycle. Amid a strong market for stocks,
especially dot-com issues, and hungry for above-market returns,
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shifts in CVC investments contribute to the low esteem with
which many venture capital funds hold in-house corporate
venture capital operations. Specifically, they view public
companies that engage in CVC as having neither the
fortitude nor nimbleness to manage the high-risk, quick
moving environment of venture capital investing.2 5 From a
historical perspective, earlier cycles of CVC reflected the ups
and downs of the broader economy. 2 6 As an example, the
absence of clear objectives and strategic focus led to the
failure of many CVCs in the third wave. 2 7
Today, however, companies take proactive measures to
address market trends by shifting their CVC investment
priorities and partnering with ventures that can mitigate the
risks experienced by the third wave CVCs.28 As a result, the
modern
CVC:
(1)
responds
quickly
to
market
transformations; (2) gathers intelligence on competitive
threats; (3) allows parent companies to more easily extricate
themselves from investments that are not advancing their
interests (as compared to the reluctance of companies to
abandon a languishing R&D project); (4) has a greater
impact since CVCs are co-investing with others; (5) manages
portfolio companies that develop technologies requiring the
use of the parent company's platform (as Apple did with the
corporations returned in force to the game, with more than 400 of them
worldwide launching VC programs." Bielesch et al., supra note 19.
European corporations and emerging markets "entered the market in
force. CVC activity reached a high point in 2000, when corporate equity
investments in new ventures soared to more than $4.5 billion, according
to GCV." Id. With the dot-coin bust in 2000 and the recession of 2001 and
2002, however, the third wave ended. Id. 'In a newly risk-averse business
environment and amid high uncertainty over new accounting and
governance regulations, corporations wound down their VC operations."

Id.
25 "In their eyes, the wild swings are further evidence that big
companies have neither the stomach nor the agility to manage
investments in high-risk, fast-paced environments." Chesbrough, supra
note 24, at 92.
26 See VoLANs & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 21.
27 See The History of CVC, supra note 18.
28 See id.

350
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iFund); and (6) allows the parent company to enjoy higher
returns on investments. 29
Since the financial crisis in 2008, the ranks of corporate
venture capital have swelled dramatically. 30 "CVC is
actually growing at a faster rate than venture capital
investment in general."31 More than 1200 corporations
across the globe have CVC programs, of which over half were
formed since 2010.32 Between 2012 and 2016 the number of
active CVCs "more than doubled."33
As of March 2017, there were approximately 200 CVCs
active in every quarter. 3 4 In 2016, CVCs grew at a rate of
twenty percent globally, with 107 new CVC funds making

29 Josh Lerner, Corporate Venturing, HARV. Bus. REV., Oct. 2013, at
86 [hereinafter Corporate Venturing].
30 See Kevin Dowd, What's Happened with the 10B+ Mega-Funds of
2008?, PITCHBOOK (Apr. 26, 2016), http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/
whats-happened-with-the- 10b-mega-funds-of-2008
[perma.cc/9WU8VAG5] (citing the financial crisis of 2008 and how the $10B+ mega-funds
fared eight years after the crisis); The Investors Fueling the Mega-Round
Phenomenon,
CB
INSIGHTS
(May
16,
2016),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/hedge-mutual-funds-investing-big-dealstech-startups/ [perma.cc/PGQ9-AGMD]. Global corporations spend more
than $650 billion on research and development on an annual basis
primarily on technological advancements. Igor Sill, New Era for Corporate
Venture Capital, ENTREPRENEUR COUNTRY GLOB. (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://www.entrepreneurcountryglobal.com/united-kingdomlecosystemeconomics/item/new-era-for-corporate-venture-capital
[perma.ccfU8AH6DLM]. See infra Part II (discussing current state of CVC).
31 The History of CVC, supra note 18.
32 Press
Release, DLA Piper, Corporate
Venture
Capital
Compensation Report Released to Support High Performance Teams and
Innovation Programs (Jan. 27,
2016), https://www.dlapiper.com/
en/us/news/2016/01/corporate-vc-compensation-report-released/ [perma.cc!
E9TX-EAW7]. But cf. Du, supra note 6 (which states that between 20102014 over 475 new CVC funds started and over 1100 are currently
operational). The number of venture capital funds has changed
significantly over a period of 20 years. In 1995, there were 425 venture
capital firms; in 2005 and 2015, there were 1009 and 798 such firms,
respectively. 2016 NVCAYEARBOOK, supra note 12.
33 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17.
34 The History of CVC, supra note 18.
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their first investment. 3 5 "Companies are using CVC as a
compelling way to drive outside-in innovation for access to
new and disruptive technologies, the development of new
business models and participation in emerging markets, all
of which may provide meaningful contributions to corporate
growth." 36 Some argue that the rise of both social media and
the smartphone was the impetus for the resurgence of
CVC.37 Historically low interest rates, together with the fact
that many corporations were also sitting on large piles of
cash, contributed to an increase in CVC as well. 38 The everpresent fear of disruption also played a role in the rise of
CVC. The former leader of Intel Capital Corporation ("Intel
Capital"), Arvind Sodhani, said, "CEOs who are worried
they're going to get disrupted want to have an outpost in
Silicon Valley to discern where the disruption is coming
from." 39 In stark contrast to the growth of CVC, "the VC
industry has consolidated, with 211 U.S. firms doing at least
five deals in a year versus 1,000 or more in 2000" and with
"60% of money now raised in funds being secured by the top
16 [traditional venture capital] firms."40
Historically, money from CVC has been invested in later
stage funding rounds.41 Even in 2015, this continued to be
the case, with $2.7 billion in corporate venture dollars
allocated to later stage companies across 159 deals,
representing nearly thirty-six percent of all such dollars.42 A
new trend has emerged, however, as CVCs have increased

35 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17, at 8.

36 Press Release, DLA Piper, supra note 32.
37 The History of CVC, supra note 18.
38 Id.

39 Randall Smith, General Mills and 7-Eleven Join the Venture
Capital
Crowd,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/business/dealbook/general-mills-and7-elevenjoin-the-venture-capital-crowd.html/ [perma.cc/K8U3-6A76].
40 See Ganesan, supranote 16.
41 See NVCA, Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High,
supra note 10.
42 Id.
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their participation in early stage deals, deploying $2.4 billion
in 442 deals in 2015.43 Although there was a marked decline
in venture capital investing in the fourth quarter of 2015,
corporate venture capital activity held steady, ending at
twenty-one percent of all deals for the year. 44 There were
also a high number of initial investments-approximately
eighty-five-made by newcomers to the corporate venture
capital realm.4 5 In the fourth quarter of 2015, CVCs invested
more money in early stage startups than in late stage
47
companies.4 6 CVCs also invested in unicorns at a high rate.
In 2016, CVC investors continued to pour money into the
market by participating in twenty-one percent of all U.S.
venture capital-backed financings.48 The average deal size
which included CVC participation was double that of deals
9
that included only traditional venture capital firms.4
Globally, Intel Capital and GV (formerly Google Ventures)

43 Id. This represents thirty-one percent of corporate venture capital
invested in 2015. Id. The increasing sophistication of corporate investors
and the fact that "companies in industries that live or die by innovation,
such as telecommunications and pharmaceutical, are increasingly eager to
capture new ideas and thus are willing to shoulder the risk of investing in
the dwindling number of [startups] in their sectors." Bielesch et al., supra
note 19.
44 NVCA, Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High,
supra note 10.
45 King, supra note 11.
46 Id. In the fourth quarter of 2015, corporate venture capitalists
invested $650 million in ninety-eight early stage company deals,
representing 55.7 percent of all dollars invested for the quarter. NVCA,
Corporate Venture Investment Hits Fifteen Year High, supra note 10.
Expansion stage companies received 23.4 percent of all dollars invested in
that same quarter, deploying $273 million in fifty-six deals. Id.
47 See ANAND SANWAL, CB INSIGHTs LIVE: STARTUPS AND ACCELERATING
INNOVATION
(2015),
slides
70-91,
CORPORATE
http://www.slideshare.net/Nikunj Sanghvi/cb-insights-live-startups-andaccelerating-corporate-innovation (last visited Mar. 28, 2018) (Sanwal is
Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of CB Insights); see also 2016
NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 26.
48 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17, at 8.
49 Id. at 36.
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were the most active CVCs.50 CVC deal activity in 2016 was
similar to 2015.51 Notably, CVC deal size from the first
quarter of 2013 through the second quarter of 2016 was
consistently larger than that of traditional venture capital
firm deal sizes.52 In the fourth quarter of 2016 alone, the
average CVC deal size reached $28 million-twice as large
as the average VC deal size, which stood at $14 million. 53 As
a result, these large sums of money from CVCs sometimes
contributed to skewed valuations for private companies.
In many ways, 2017 was similar to 2016. CVC investors
participated in approximately the same number of U.S.
venture capital-backed financings at 847 deals.5 4 Intel
Capital and GV were again the most active CVCs globally. 5 5
However, the average venture capital deals size increased
slightly in 2017.56 CVC deals were, on average, $5 billion
larger than their traditional venture capital firm
counterpart. 57
CVCs deployed half of their corporate venture capital
dollars to software companies ($1.2 billion) and nearly
thirteen percent ($320 million) to biotechnology companies in
2017.58 CVCs participated in twenty-five percent of all
venture deals and nearly eighteen percent in the
biotechnology company context. 5 9 Other notable highlights

52

Id. at 21.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 36.

53

Id.

50
51

CB INSIGHTS, THE 2017 GLOBAL CVC REPORT 6 (2018),
https://www.cbinsights.com/reports/CB-InsightsCVC-Report-2017.pdf
[perma.cc/4YBD-KTK9] [hereinafter 2017 GLOBAL CVC REPORT].
55 Id. at 16.
56 Id. at 12.
54

57

Id.

Press Release, Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Corporate Venture
Engagement in Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Continues to Rise (Apr. 22,
2016),
http://nvca.org/pressreleases/corporate-venture-engagemententrepreneurial-ecosystem-continues-rise/
[perma.ccIG57D-RTQFI
[hereinafter NVCA, Corporate Venture Engagement Rise].
58

59

Id.
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include CVCs' more active participation in the seed stage,
60
and CVCs' continued focus on early stage companies. CVCs
also expanded to more industries, in many cases outside
their core areas of expertise. As an example, the top
corporate investors in e-commerce companies for the period
of 2010 to August 29, 2016 were Intel Capital and GV,
ranked at numbers one and two, respectively. 6 1 Note,
however, that the parent companies of each of the
aforementioned CVC arms have historically not focused on ecommerce. 6 2 Intel Capital and GV, along with Motorola
Solutions Venture Capital and Qualcomm Ventures,
comprised the top four in terms of investments in private instore technology companies from the period of 2010 to
August 4, 2016.63 The parent companies of each of these
CVCs are not focused on in-store technology the way one
might imagine a retail company like Walmart (which is
ranked 46th in terms of investments in this space) would
6
be. 4

Over a twenty-year period, investments by U.S.-based
CVCs have increased seventeen-fold. 65 In 2009, CVCs
invested nearly $1.4 billion in 411 deals or 12.9 percent of all
venture capital deals; 6 6 2010 was much of the same with
CVCs investing $1.8 billion in 473 deals, comprising 12.8
percent of all venture capital deals. 6 7 In addition to an
increase in dollars invested, since 2011 there has also been
an uptick in the number of deals. CVCs invested almost $2.4
60

Id.

Big Box vs. Big Tech: Retailers Sit on Hands when It Comes to
2016),
(Sept.
14,
INSIGHTS
CB
Startup Bets and M&A,
61

https://www.cbinsights.comblog/big-retail-vs-tech-future-commerce/
[perma.cc/5XRC-NJ3A].
62

Id.

63

Id.
Id.

64

65 In 1995, there was $433 million in CVC investments. By 2015,
CVCs invested $7.76 billion in private companies. NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL
AsS'N, Q1 2016 CORPORATE VENTURE ACTIVITY (2016) (on file with author).
66

Id.

67

Id.
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billion in 595 deals that equaled 14.6 percent of all venture
capital financings. 68 The increase in the number of venture
capital financings and percent of venture capital deals with
CVC involvement continued. Other reports note that U.S.based CVCs participated in 607 deals or 16.3 percent of all
venture capital financings in 2013, 788 deals or 18.5 percent
in 2014, 851 deals or 20 percent in 2015, 752 deals or 21
percent in 2016,69 and 847 deals or about 20 percent in
2017.70 The increase in deal activity and not just dollars
invested shows greater involvement and suggests a new,
emerging role of CVC in directing outcomes. Bobby Franklin,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the National
Venture Capital Association remarked on this shift in
behavior: "[C]orporations are increasingly engaging in a
more meaningful way with startup founders and the broader
entrepreneurial ecosystem." 7 1 An increasing number of
corporations choose to start CVCs, recognizing the
importance of keeping up with the newest innovations. "The
benefits of this deeper engagement accrue not only to the
parent corporations but also the startups as they draw on
the knowledge, expertise and networks of the parent
corporations to scale and grow." 7 2
Regarding CVC, corporations want the ability to enhance
their R&D efforts in a nimbler way and perhaps have even
better acquisition opportunities.73 In short, they want to be
part of the disruptive innovation that the media, companies,
and Wall Street all laud. 74 In the past, "incumbency was the
68 Id.
69 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 17, at 33.
70 See 2017 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra note 54, at 3, 9, 11.

71 NVCA, Corporate Venture Engagement Rise, supra note 58.
72

Id.

73 "For the corporations, the purpose of CVCs is to increase the
flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit of otherwise large, bureaucratic,
multi-billion dollar companies. CVCs essentially act as a supplement to
internal research and development. In this way, investing in small
companies serves as a gateway for possible acquisition." Du, supranote 6.
74 Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?,
HARv. Bus. REV., Dec. 2015, at 46, https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-
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goal.... Now incumbency is seen as a burden.... Precisely
the organizational capabilities that underlie success in the
industry as currently understood blind the firm to threats
from outside of the dominant conception." 75 One might argue
that CVC is itself disruptive. 7 6 Additionally, public
companies use CVC to look more closely at potential
disruptors to their line of business. By identifying and
holding equity in these startups, the public (parent)
companies using CVC hope to prevent the failure of the

('Disruption'

describes a

process whereby a smaller company with fewer resources ...

disruptive-innovation

[perma.cc/7SUA-W4EJ]

successfully

challenge[s] established incumbent businesses. Specifically, as incumbents
focus on improving their products and services for their most demanding
... customers, they exceed the needs of some segments and ignore the
needs of others."). Smaller companies target overlooked segments typically
at a lower price. Id. Incumbents don't respond vigorously since they are
focused on customers that will give them greater profits. Id. "Entrants
then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incumbents'
mainstream customers require, while preserving the advantages that
drove their early success. When mainstream customers start adopting the
entrants' offerings in volume, disruption has occurred." Id. The authors
also noted that disruptive innovations get started in low-end or newmarket footholds. Id. at 47. In the case of the low-end market, disrupters
are initially focused on giving low-end customers a product that is "good
enough." Id. With respect to new-market footholds, disrupters figure out
how to convert nonconsumers into consumers. Id. The authors contend
that Uber is not a disrupter because it started off by establishing itself as
a contender in the mainstream market and then appealed to overlooked
markets. Id.
75 Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegrationand Interfirm Collaboration,109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 442
(2009).
76 "Our current belief is that companies should create a separate
division that operates under the protection of senior leadership to explore
and exploit a new disruptive model." Christensen et al., supra note 74. In
other words, perhaps the fact that public companies want to figure out a
better way of identifying future disrupters in their respective industries or
the next big innovation through small bets, like Alphabet does with Other
Bets (see discussion infra Subsection III.B regarding GV and other entities
under the banner of Other Bets) shows how leaders in public companies
explore and exploit new, disruptive models.
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parent company in the future.77 "The entire technology
industry is easily disrupted, with small companies exploding
onto the scene and overtaking giants every couple years."78
At first blush, it may appear that CVC is heading toward
another boom-and-bust cycle. Yet some experts believe that
CVC is not destined to repeat such a cycle. 79 In the past,
CVCs tended to mirror the VC investment climate.SO In this
fourth wave of CVC, however, the numbers indicate that

CVCs are developing their own investment rhythm
independent of the venture capital funds. 8 1 No longer an
experiment, CVCs have entered a more mature chapter and
now have a global reach.8 2 They are becoming more

sophisticated and strategic as they expand to new industries,
looking toward adjacent and downstream industries, and

Du, supra note 6.
78 Id.
77

79 Bielesch et al., supranote 19.
80 "In the past, corporate interest in creating venture funds tended .to
wax and wane in sync with the general VC climate. Waves of corporate
venture activity-in the late 1960s, the mid-1980s, and the late 1990scorresponded with booms in VC investments and venture-backed IPOs."
CorporateVenturing, supra note 29, at 88.
81 "But now we're seeing a corporate-venturing surge even during
lackluster days for traditional venture capital." Id. During the global
financial crisis, CVC funds invested more than eleven percent of the
venture capital dollars-this was reminiscent of the amount invested by
CVC funds during the dot-com boom. Id. "This new activity may indicate
that as research functions face severe pressure to rein in costs and produce
results, companies are looking for alternative means to learn and
innovate." Id.
82 Corporate Venture CapitalAbroad: These Are the Top CVCs in the
UK,
China, and
India,
CB
INSIGHTS
(Mar.
30,
2016),
https://www.cbinsights.comblog/top-corporate-venture-firms-uk-chinaindia] [perma.cc/K8ND-YZYL]. CVCs invest in private companies in
countries such as China, the United Kingdom, and India. Id. For example,
Qualcomm Ventures ranks in the top four for the three aforementioned
markets, while Intel Capital is the top CVC investor in China and India.
Id.
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reallocating resources to corporate venture capital instead of
R&D.83
II. THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE VENTURE
CAPITAL ON PRIVATE ORDERING IN THE
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTEXT
The addition of a new major player-CVC-has
fundamentally changed the dynamics of private ordering in
the venture capital realm. Specifically, today, there are three
major players in venture capital: (1) the entrepreneurs who
found the startups; (2) the venture capital funds (and the
limited partners who fund them); and (3) CVC. CVC exerts
its own, independent force on the innovation industry. Yet
legal scholarship has ignored or downplayed CVC, focusing
84
solely on the relationship between the first two players.
This Part adds CVC to the theoretical structure of venture
capitalism and explains the broadening influence of CVC on
private ordering.
As Professor Ronald Gilson asserts, "[a]ll financial
contracts respond to three central problems: uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of

83 "In many cases, they are looking past the boundaries of their own
industries toward adjacent and downstream industries, and they are
banding together with companies from other industries to fund promising
new ideas." Bielesch et al., supra note 19.
84 See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE (2d ed. 2004); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital
Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067,
1069 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market]
(noting that three central inputs are necessary for a venture capital
market: capital, specialized intermediaries, and entrepreneurs). The
intermediaries Gilson refers to are the venture capital funds through
which institutional investors such as pension funds, banks, endowments,
and foundations invest as passive limited partners. See id. at 1070; Steven
N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, FinancialContracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Venture Capital Contracts,70 REV. ECON.
STUD. 281 (2003).
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agency costs."85 In order to address these problems in the
venture capital context, Professor Gilson identifies five
organizational
and
contractual
techniques:
"staged
financing, allocation of elements of control, form of
compensation, the role of exit, and reliance on implicit
contracts."8 6 This Part shows how CVCs have developed
their own versions of these foundational techniques,
borrowing from traditional venture capital where helpful,
but charting their own path in significant and influential
ways.
A.

The Entrepreneur

To fund an innovation, entrepreneurs need money-in
many cases, a lot of it.87 While entrepreneurs may be able to
secure a bank loan or debt financing for their startup,
because of their need for significant funds, lack of
substantial tangible assets, uncertain prospects, and the
expectation that the startup will not turn a profit for many
years, venture capital is frequently the more viable option.8 8
By engaging in a venture capital financing, the
entrepreneurs are selling an ownership stake in the startup
to venture capitalists. By doing so, the company and the
entrepreneur receive the following three things: (1) an
explicit contract for "capital plus nonfinancial contributions
including information, monitoring, and enhanced credibility
with third parties," 8 9 (2) "an implicit incentive contract
denominated in control,"9 0 and (3) "the explicit contract
between the venture capital fund and the portfolio company
[that] ensures that important control rights that were
85 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at
1076.
86 Id. at 1078.
87 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 84, at 6.
88 Id.

89 Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the
Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN.
ECON. 243, 259 (1998).
90 Id.
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initially given to the fund ... disappear on an initial public
offering."91 Put differently, the relationship between
entrepreneurs and a venture capital fund is structured
through management assistance (both financial and
nonfinancial contributions), intensive monitoring and
92
control, and a reputation market.
B.

The Venture Capital Fund

Venture capital funds raise capital from limited partners
(i.e., passive investors) for their venture capital funds. 9 3 A
standard limited partnership agreement between the two
parties sets a maximum term for the partnership of seven to
ten years; at the end of the term, the partnership is
liquidated. 9 4 As part of the agreement, the limited partners
do not have the right to approve the investment decisions
made by the general partners, exemplifying the Berle-Means
problem of the separation of ownership (which lies with the
limited partner in this case) and control (which lies with the
general partners who were not the providers of the bulk of

at 261 (these rights include guaranteed board seats and the
91 Id.
ability to block certain business decisions). See also D. Gordon Smith,
Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUs. L. 133, 134-35 (1998) (identifying the problems of
shirking, opportunism and incompetence that entrepreneurs face when
trying to obtain value-added services from venture capitalists).
92 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 252-55.
93 Typically, the limited partners are public employee pension funds,
endowments, philanthropic foundations, and insurance companies, to
name a few. Funding Innovation, NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N,
[perma.cc/8Z8U-TDDU].
http://nvca.org/ecosystem/funding-innovation/
Traditional venture capital is what most people think of when venture
capital is discussed-they are standalone investment entities. "Venture
capital is financing that investors provide to startup companies and small
businesses that are believed to have long-term growth potential." For
startups without access to capital markets, venture capital is an essential
Capital,
INVESTOPEDIA,
See
Venture
of
money.
source
[perma.cc/
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/venturecapital.asp
K6Z9-3KKF.
94 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 256.
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the capital).95 The general partner is typically structured as
a company (what this Article refers to as a venture capital
fund) owned by professional investors who decide which
companies to invest in-typically at the early stages of the
private company and focused on a particular sector-and
play an active role, often times serving on the board.96
Specifically, "[v]enture capital investors specialize in
providing portfolio companies with a combination of financial
capital, monitoring and advisory services, and reputational
capital." 97 There is an implicit contract for these
nonfinancial contributions by the venture capital funds. 98
Typically, the general partner of the fund puts in only one
percent of the capital and the limited partners put in the
other ninety-nine percent; however, it is the general partner
who has complete control over the fund.99 Since the general
partner "expects to continue in the venture capital market by
raising successive funds after the capital in a particular fund
has been invested in portfolio companies ...[it] provides a
powerful performance incentive [for the general partner]."100
The general partner is compensated annually with a small
management fee, which is between two to 2.5 percent of the
committed capital.101 Assuming that its portfolio companies
have done well, at the time that distributions are made to
the limited partners the general partner is handsomely
rewarded in the form of a carried interest.102
95

See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE

MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
96 The venture capital investors (i.e., the investment

professionals at
the venture capital firm) and the limited partners will enter into a limited
partnership agreement. FundingInnovation, supra note 93.
97 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 245.
98 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at
1073.
99 Id.

at 1071.
100 Id. The general partner is already fundraising for its next fund

during the middle of the ten-year term of a current fund. Id.
101 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supranote 84, at 124.
102 Carried interest is "a share of any profits that the general partners

of private equity and hedge funds receive as compensation, regardless of
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A venture capital fund's initial investment in a startup is
not sufficient to fund the entire operations of the company
for the duration of its existence until it is either acquired or
goes public. Instead, the investment is staged. 103 The
venture capital fund is expected to participate in subsequent
rounds (assuming that the company is progressing in a
manner that the venture capital fund agrees with); however,
it is not contractually bound to do so. 104 Like the
nonfinancial contributions, it is an implicit contract. 105 These
staged capital infusions keep the company "on a 'tight leash'
06
and [reduce] potential losses from bad decisions."1
The governance structure created by a venture capital
fund's investment contrasts to the Berle-Means governance
structure where investors have greater equity and far less
control.1 0 7 The venture capital investors have much greater
control than equity.Z0 8
Noted legal scholars contend that "a well-developed stock
market that permits venture capitalists to exit through an
IPO is critical to the existence of a vibrant venture capital
market."109 Put differently, IPOs create an exit and
reinvestment cycle for both the venture capitalists and the
limited partners who provide capital for the funds of venture
capital firms. Not only is the cash contribution recycled since
whether or not they contributed any initial funds. This method of
compensation seeks to motivate the general partner (fund manager) to
work toward improving the fund's performance." Carried Interest,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/carriedinterest.asp
INVESTOPEDIA,
[perma.cc/4KLK-6XWL].
103 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at
1073.
104
105

Id.
Id.

106 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 84, at 171.

107 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at

1073.
108 Id. at 1073-74 (citing an example of the venture capital investors

having a majority of the board seats despite not having a majority of the
equity of the portfolio company).
109 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 245.
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the limited partners may be repeat investors in other
venture capital funds of the general partner, but the noncash
contributions of the venture capital funds will also be
recycled. The exit addresses three challenges between
venture capitalists and the limited partners who invest in
their funds because it allows the limited partners to: (1)
evaluate the performance of the venture capital firms; (2)
determine how much to allocate to venture capital relative to
other investments; and (3) withdraw their funds from
venture capital firms which are not successful.110 The model
proposed by Professors Black and Gilson "predicts that the
[VC's] successful exits will take place disproportionately
through IPO. If so, IPO exits will be more profitable than
exits through sale of the portfolio company. . . ."111
Professor Gilson identified three basic characteristics of
the venture capital market based on the organizational and
contractual techniques that he discusses throughout his
various articles on the subject: (1) "high power incentives...
for investors, GPs, and entrepreneurs are coupled with very
intense
monitoring,"112 (2) "the organizational
and
contractual structure reflects the use of both explicit and
implicit contracts,"113 and (3) the braiding of the venture
capital fund limited partnership agreement and the portfolio
company investment contract "facilitates the resolution of

110 Id. at 255. In a later article, Gilson and a coauthor note:
A firm's decision to go (or remain) public . . . may
increasingly be less a function of the need to raise risk
capital or diversity risk, as in the traditional construct, and
more a balance between the incremental costs of going
public . . . and the incremental benefits of being a public
company.
Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 231, 258 (2008).
111 Black & Gilson, supra note 89, at 264.

112 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at
1078 (emphasis in original).
113 Id.
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problems internal to each."114 In other words, formal and
informal contracts are governance mechanisms that work (or
1 5
braid) together in response to the holdup problem. '
C.

CVC

As discussed in Part I, the purpose of CVC, the levels and
stage of investment from CVC, and the role of CVC in the
1
startup ecosystem have metamorphized over the years. 16
Corporations have different rationales for forming CVC
arms, including financial returns and gaining perspective on
what could be the next market disrupter.117 They are also
motivated by the opportunity to "identifyf novel technologies
to enhance revenue streams and amplify a corporation's
competitive position [and] validation of new market
segments, as well as [to] leverage[el relationships between
the corporate venture capital portfolio and corporate
business units."118 Engaging in CVC activities may give
parent companies access to more disruptive R&D, give R&D
more scale, and provide companies access to talent and

114 Id. But cf. Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation
Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 309-10 (2016) (arguing that "the
ownership, prosecution, and protection of foreground [intellectual
property] are key-if overlooked-topics in many of the agreements that
form the basis of Gilson et al.'s braiding theory").
115 The holdup problem is defined through the lens of contract
economics which "has focused on how uncertainty and measurement
problems combine with opportunism and asset specificity to lead to holdup
problems." Jennejohn, supra note 114, at 315.
116 Benchmarking CorporateVenture Capital,CB INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights'.comresearch-benchmarking-corporate-venturecapital [perma.cc/57ES-XTLR].
117 See MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, THE BUSINESS OF VENTURE CAPITAL
22 (2d ed. 2014) (opining that everyone is interested in the "newest new
thing").
118 Id. at 22-23. Ramsinghani also notes that "[a]bout 60 percent of
corporations invest in ventures funds as LPs, and 90 percent of CVCs
invest directly in [startups]." Id. at 23.
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markets to which they would not otherwise be exposed.119
Traditional R&D within the parent company, in contrast, is
increasingly seen as costly and ineffective.12 0
Professor Henry Chesbrough of Harvard Business School
wrote the seminal piece on corporate venture capital in
which he identified four different investment categories for
corporate venture capital: (1) driving, (2) enabling, (3)
emergent, and (4) passive. 12 1
A driving investment is both strategic and tightly linked
to the operations of the company that is investing.122 Such
an investment sustains the current strategy of the company,
but does not address when a company is faced with
disruptive strategies or new opportunities.123 For example,
Campbell Soup Company's corporate venture capital arm
119 Not the Same: Understanding Corporate Venture Capital Versus
Institutional
VCs,
CB
INSIGHTS
(Feb.
5,
2016),
https://www.cbinsights.comresearch/corporate-venture-capitalinstitutional-venture-capital/ [perma.cc/RM25-ZTQ5]. CVCs also look at
what type of startup will benefit the corporation. As one CVC head noted,
as a startup, "[y]ou must convey how you can benefit the organization, not
how it can help you solve the challenges you're facing as a startup. This
requires understanding the core business of the fund . .. as well as why
pursuing a relationship would be mutually beneficial for both
organizations." Ilya Pozin, Three Things to Know About CorporateVenture
Capital, INC. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.inc.comlilya-pozin/3-things-toknow-corporate-venture-capital.html [perma.cc/N7H8-QKGS].
120 Josh Lerner, How Corporate Venture Capital Helps Firms Explore
New
Territories,
HARv.
Bus.
REV.
(Sept.
10,
2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/09/how-corporate-venture-capital.html
[https://perma.cc/6STQ-49ZC] [hereinafter New Territories]. "Corporate
R&D too often focuses on refining technologies that are already in use ....
For decades in the U.S., billions were spent on big science, and the
commercial returns were disappointing

....

R&D has a tendency to be

slow, rigid, and expensive." Id.
121 Chesbrough, supranote 24, at 95.
122 Id.
123 "The tight coupling of these investments with a company's current
processes means that these investments will sustain the current strategy.
They will be unlikely to help a corporation cope with disruptive strategies
or to identify new opportunities when the company must.., respond to...
a change in the environment." Id. at 94.
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could fit into this category because of its investments in
24
startups that offer healthier food alternatives.1
An enabling investment is one which is not as tightly
interwoven with the company's own operations, but the goal
of the investment is primarily strategic.12 5 This type of
investment will encourage the development of the company's
current ecosystem of suppliers, customers, and third-party
developers which will in turn enhance the demand for the
company's own products. 12 6 Intel Capital is cited as an
example.127
The focus of emergent investments is not on enhancing
strategy, but rather for the startup to be tightly linked to the
This investment
operating capabilities.128
company's
strategy can be helpful if the company's strategy or the
business environment changes; it provides the company with
strategic business options beyond any potential financial
gains the investment may produce. 129 In other words, it
means that the company is investing in a technology that it
has no current intention to use in its own products, but that
it was involved in developing and can incorporate into its
business plans if circumstances change.130 Alphabet is a good
example: it invests in businesses outside its main products.
Lastly, a passive investment is neither connected to the
corporation's strategy nor is it tightly linked to the
corporation's operational capabilities. 31 Therefore, the

See discussion infra Section III.C and accompanying notes about
Campbell Soup Company.
125 Chesbrough, supra note 24, at 95.
126 "A company can take advantage of this notion by using its [venture
capital] investments to stimulate the development of the ecosystem in
which it operates-that is, the suppliers, customers, and third-party
developers that make goods and services that stimulate demand for the
company's own offerings." Id.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 96.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 96-97.
131 Id. at 97-98.
124
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company cannot advance its own business. 132 Chesbrough
even characterizes passive investing as "arguably a misuse of
shareholders' funds." 133 The other three investment types, in
contrast, each cultivate the expansion of a company's current
or future businesses.134
As Professor Chesbrough notes, however, a company's
"resources and processes can become liabilities rather than
capabilities, particularly when it faces new markets or
disruptive technologies."1 35 The investments "are made
primarily to increase the sales and profits of the
corporation's own businesses. A company making a strategic
investment seeks to identify and exploit synergies between
itself and a new venture." 136 If the objective is financial, the
company's primary goal is a high rate of return. 137
Unlike venture capital funds, the corporations engaged in
CVC do not need to raise money from limited partners. In
fact, they may have much more capital at their disposal than
their venture capital fund counterparts. Sources of capital
for CVC include the corporate level of the parent company,
one of the parent company's business units, or external
investment partners, such as a venture capital fund; the
former is the most common.138 In terms of the legal
mechanics, CVCs are structured in a few different ways: (1)
corporations join existing venture capital funds as limited

132 "[T]he corporation lacks the means to actively advance its own
business through these investments." Id. at 98.
133

Id.

134 Id. (including the "Paths to Growth" chart).
135 Id. at 94.
136 Id. at 92.

137 "Here, a corporation seeks to do as well as or better than private
VC investors, due to what it sees as its superior knowledge of markets and
technologies, its strong balance sheet, and its ability to be a patient
investor." Id. The company's brand may also attest to the startup's quality
to other investors and potential customers. Id.
138 IAN MACMILLAN ET AL., NAVL INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST
GCR 08-916, CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL (CVC): SEEKING INNOVATION
AND STRATEGIC GROWTH (2008).
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partners;139 (2) current operating business units are tasked
with venture capital investing;140 (3) wholly-owned
subsidiaries are organized for the exclusive purpose of
CVC;141 (4) dedicated funds are co-managed by a venture
capital fund and the corporation;14 2 and (5) evergreen or
discretionary funds make investments opportunistically and
1 3
capital is allocated when such opportunities arise. 4 CVC
operations are structured in a variety of ways ranging from
simple (resembling the general partner, limited partner
structure of a venture capital fund) to complex.144 "The
simplest way to structure a [CVC] operation is for the
corporation to invest as a [venture capitalist] directly from
the corporate treasury, with employees managing the
investment activities."145 Due to financial issues (i.e.,
accounting, tax, and compensation) and internal corporate
politics, however, corporations have had to implement
46
creative structures or contractual arrangements. 1

139 Gary Dushnitsky, Corporate Venture Capital: Past Evidence and
Future Directions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 408

(Anuradha Basu et al. eds., 2008).
140 Id.; see discussion infra Subsection III.C and accompanying notes
(discussing General Mills' structure).
141 Nokia Ventures is an example of this. Dushnitsky, supra note 139,
at 408; see discussion infra Sections III.A and III.B and accompanying
notes (discussing the structures of GV and Intel Capital).
142 Sequoia Seed Capital, a joint venture between Sequoia Capital and
Cisco Systems is an example of a dedicated fund. Dushnitsky, supra note
139, at 408.
143 IAN MACMILLAN ETAL., supra note 138.

144 Asher Bearman, Corporate Venture Capital-An Introduction,
23,
2012),
(Feb.
ALLEY
VENTURE
THE
DLA
PIPER:
https://web. archive.org/web/20151019014806Ihttp://www.theventurealley.c
om/corporate-venture-capital-an-introduction.
145 Id. This type of structure may be best suited for new players to
CVC that are able to be the sole capital source for the venture capital
investments. Id.
146

See id.
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D. The Effect of CVC on Private Ordering
Thus far, this Article has explained what private ordering
historically looked like when the two main parties were the
entrepreneurs and the venture capital fund, and has also
provided background information on CVCs. Next, this Article
turns to how the "new" player-CVC-has impacted private
ordering in the venture capital financing context specifically
regarding the five techniques that address the three major
contractual problems. In short, staged financing, control,
compensation, exit, and reliance on implicit contracts help
with the problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry,
and opportunism in the form of agency costs.
First, unlike the goals of a venture capital firm which are
solely financial, the goals of a CVC are hybrid in naturethey are both financial and strategic.14 7 Whether CVC
investments skew more towards financial or strategic
depends on which one of Chesbrough's four categories
corporate venture capital falls in. In terms of private
ordering, the two-pronged goals of a CVC may affect the
staging aspect of a venture capital financing. Staging is
intended to respond to the high degree of uncertainty that
early stage companies face.148 In effect, staging gives
investors the option to cease providing funds if the
entrepreneur fails to reach certain milestones.14 9 By creating
this performance incentive, it "aligns the interests of the
venture capital fund and entrepreneur."1 50 It also reduces
agency costs because it shifts the decision to continue the

147 VOLANS & GLOBAL CORP. VENTURING, supra note 6, at 9 (Strategy
includes "[d]eveloping capabilities, access and . . . markets of the parent
company, aligning with long-term strategy. Multiple CVC units may be
created to focus on different aspects of the strategy-and they often adapt
and evolve over time. A strategic CVC investment will identify and
amplify synergies between itself and the venture.").
148 Gilson, Engineeringa Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at
1078.
149 Id. at 1079.

150

Id.
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startup from the entrepreneur to the venture capital fund. 151
However, a CVC may not be incentivized solely by the goal of
maximizing its financial return from the investment in the
startup. As such, a CVC may decide to continue funding a
startup even if a startup did not reach a particular
milestone. Alternatively, a CVC may decide not to provide
additional funding, even if the startup is making progress in
the business, if the success of the startup is no longer aligned
with the success of the CVC's parent. This may increase the
agency costs since now there are multiple decision-makers
instead of the venture capital fund and they are not all
motivated to accomplish the same goals. Also, a CVC may
still intend to continue to invest in a startup (even if a
venture capital fund did not) because it may be interested in
acquiring the company for strategic reasons or seeing how
the startup develops technology in ways that they may not
have anticipated. CVCs are not focused on maximizing
financial returns on their investments like venture capital
firms are which may frustrate the venture capital firm. The
firm may disagree with the CVC, yet still be compelled to
allocate its limited dollars in the venture capital fund to
continue to maintain the fund's percentage ownership and
therefore the control levers set forth in the venture capital
financing documents. If the CVC was the lead investor in the
deal, it may also decide to fund the bulk of the round (and
therefore have the majority or two-thirds vote necessary to
revise certain key parts of the Certificate of Incorporation,
52
such as the antidilution and protective provisions).1
Recent studies show that CVCs have now expanded their
investments to all stages of a startup (but still make the
majority of their investments in the seed/early stage or the

Id. at 1080.
152 See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New
Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 594-95 (2016). However, if the
venture capital fund was the lead investor in a prior round of funding, its
vote would be required to amend the Certificate of Incorporation and
approve a new round of financing.
151
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late stage). 153 If a CVC is the lead investor in the early
stages of a startup or holds a sizeable percentage ownership
in a particular financing round, the startup will typically
need its vote for future funding decisions based upon the
votes required under the amendment provisions in the
Certificate of Incorporation. As a result, venture capital
funds will need to navigate how syndicates are formed.
There is also the question of whether the CVC may be
around long term to fund the various stages of financing
(assuming that it would choose to fund at each stage). The
life span of a venture capital fund is dictated by the terms of
the limited partnership agreement it enters into and is
typically between seven to ten years. The life span of a CVC,
in contrast, may vary widely since it is typically not bound to
a limited partnership agreement. Generally speaking, CVCs
now have longer life spans than before, though typically not
as long as a venture capital fund.154 In the past, CVC
programs lasted no longer than one to two years.15 5 In the
fourth wave, however, the majority of CVC programs have
been active for four years or longer.156 "The lengthening life
153 PITCHBOOK,

2Q 2017 PITCHBOOK-NVCA VENTURE MONITOR 14

(2017), http://files.pitchbook.com/pdf/2Q_2017 PitchBook_NVCAVenture_
Monitor.pdf [perma.cc/4GL8-23E8]; 2016 GLOBAL CVC REPORT, supra ndte
17.
154 There are two groups of CVCs--one with a long history of
corporate venturing (technology, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, and
media and publishing) called "CVC first movers" and the other, "CVC
follower" group comprising of machinery, power and gas production,
consumer, and construction. Bielesch et al., supra note 19.
155 Corporate Venture Capital (CVC), EWING MARION KAUFFMAN
FOUND.,

http://www.kauffman.org/microsites/state-of-the-field/topics/

finance/equity/corporate-venture-capital [perma.ccIWL2Y-MFFK].
156 Id. But cf. Gary Dushnitsky, Riding the Next Wave of Corporate
Venture Capital, 3 Bus. STRATEGY REV. 44, 44 (2011) (which states that the
average lifespan for CVC in the past was 2.5 years and is now 3.8 years
with more prominent CVCs now in their second decade of activity).
Furthermore, forty percent of the approximately 350 corporate investors in
the 2000-2009 timeframe were in operation for four or more years, which
was almost double the longevity of CVCs in previous wave. Id. Another
source reports that CVCs have an average age of five years and 120 last
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spans of CVC units may be the most compelling evidence
that venture investing is finding a permanent place in the
corporate-development arsenal and has become a must-have
innovation tool in many industries."15 7 The increasing
duration of CVCs indicates the level of commitment of
corporations to CVCs and shows how commonplace such
investing is becoming. 158 However, it is unclear how long
more recent corporate investors will remain committed to
their CVC programs, and is one aspect to keep in mind in the
context of staged financings.
Second, Professor Gilson observes that venture capital
funds typically have more control than equity.159 This control
is established through the five major documents of a venture
capital financing: the Certificate of Incorporation, the Stock
Purchase Agreement, the Investors' Rights Agreement, the
Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement, and the
Voting Agreement. The control levers set forth in the
documents address the uncertainty and information
asymmetry of funding early stage companies by incentivizing
the venture capital fund to closely monitor the startup's
ten years or more-this is longer than the tenure of many chief executive
officers. If You Can't Beat Them, Buy Them, ECONOMIST (Nov. 22, 2014),
http://www.economist.comlnews/finance-and-economics/21633883-fearbeing-displaced-startups-turning-firms-venture-capitalists-if
[perma.cc/DRT6-LZYM].
157 "Average lifetimes of corporate venture units are increasing across
the board, in industries with a long history of venture activity as well as
industries that are relative newcomers to the game." Bielesch et al., supra
note 19. Since 2002, the life span of CVC units in the pharmaceutical
industry has increased by fifty percent and, in the case of CVCs in
technology, from 2002 to 2012, it has increased to almost six years. Id.
Newcomers to the CVC world also have longer life spans. Id. As an
example, CVCs in the consumer industry had a lifespan of 10.5 years in
2012 compared to 3.3 years in 2002. Id.
158 "No longer an exotic sideline indulged in by a handful of wellheeled giants in clearly circumscribed industries, it is ...well on its way
to becoming a mainstream innovation and corporate-development activity,
alongside R&D, M&A, and joint venturing." Id.
159 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at
1081-82.
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progress during each period of the staged financing.160
However, the role of CVCs in monitoring activities of a
startup is unclear. As an example, venture capital funds
typically do not invest in competing companies in their
specialized area of investment-a venture capital fund would
not invest in two artificial intelligence companies working to
solve the exact same problem. In contrast, CVCs may be
investing in companies that directly compete with each other
or that have a direct correlation to the work of the parent
company of the CVC. Furthermore, CVCs are increasingly
taking board seats. This may impact the levers of control
currently put in place by the venture capital financing
documents and also lead to conflicts of interest.
Third, the compensation structure of both the
entrepreneur and the investors investing on behalf of the
venture capital fund, "creates extremely high-powered
performance incentives that serve to align the incentives of
the portfolio company management and the venture capital
fund."161 The entrepreneurs, who are typically the founders
and play a management role in the company, receive
relatively low salaries, but have significant stock ownership
which has the potential to increase substantially in value if
the company has a successful exit.16 2 However, under the
terms of a Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement, the stock
vests over time to incentivize the founder to stay during the
formative years of the company.16 3
In the case of the venture capital fund, under the terms of
the limited partnership agreement between the venture
capital fund and limited partners, "[b]y investing through a
financial intermediary, [limited partners] secure the benefit
of the [general partner's] skill and experience, which help to
160

Id.

161

Id. at 1083.

162

Id.

While a founder may be able to negotiate some amount of vesting
upfront for time put into the company, the vesting schedule needs to be
reasonable from the perspective of investors to incentivize the founder to
stay with the company for a longer period of time. See Fan, supranote 152.
163
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reduce the level of uncertainty and information asymmetry
that must be addressed in the contract governing a portfolio
company's investment." 164 This benefit comes at a steep
cost-general partners wield the utmost discretion to use
their skills and experience to make investments on the
investors' behalf.165 The compensation structure addresses
agency costs by paying carried interest to the general
partners. 16 6
CVCs, unlike venture capital funds, may not receive
carried interest or fixed fees. Therefore, the incentives
between the venture capital fund and entrepreneur on the
one hand, and the CVC on the other hand, may be
misaligned. Some corporations may structure their CVC
funds as independent or semi-independent funds to ensure
that corporations can recruit and retain talent to manage
their respective CVC investments by offering compensation
that's competitive with venture capital funds, including
carried interest. 167 While there is growing evidence that
CVCs are heading in this direction, compensation for CVCs
is still a work-in-progress.168 If CVCs have compensation
structures similar to venture capital funds, it is easier to
retain the employees who are investing in portfolio
companies. If the personal compensation of each of the major
players is tied to the success of the startup, there will be an
69
alignment of interests of all parties involved.1
164

Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at

1088.
165

Id.

Id. at 1088-89. Carried interest is typically 20% of the of the
venture capital fund's profits. There is also a yearly fixed fee of 2% to
2.5%. See id. at 1090.
167 Id.
168 See Dana Olsen, These 5 Charts Illustrate Current CVC
5,
2017),
(Apr.
PITCHBOOK
Trends,
Compensation
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/these-5-charts-illustrate-current-cvccompensation-trends [perma.cc/8V75- 58LT].
169 That being said, the "intensity of the performance incentives
created by the compensation structure gives rise to a corresponding
incentive for the venture capital to monitor the portfolio company's
166
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In order to ensure that funds are deployed effectively,
corporate venture capitalists cannot "become entangled in
the agendas of various corporate stakeholders
or
demotivated by inadequate or poorly designed financial
incentives. That's why it's important that venture funds'
goals be aligned with corporate objectives, approvals for
funding be streamlined, and compensation levels match
those offered by independent venture groups."170 One study
showed that there was a direct correlation between the
performance of CVCs and payment structure-if the
investment professionals employed by CVCs had similar
performance pay to venture capital funds then their
performance was better.171
Fourth, while venture capital funds are highly motivated
to exit and strive to provide significant returns to their
limited partners, CVCs do not operate within the same time
limitations nor are they necessarily motivated by financial
concerns. In fact, taking CVC money may have the
unintended effect of allowing private companies to stay
private longer because CVCs are not pushed to exit by
limited partners like venture capital and private equity
funds are.1 72 The dramatic increase in corporate venture
capital activity contributed to mind-boggling valuations of
private companies. When corporate venture capital was
deployed in later stage financings (at a rate of nearly thirty-

performance. This monitoring, together with the signaling properties of
the entrepreneur's willingness to accept such powerful incentives, also
serves to reduce information asymmetries." Gilson, Engineering a Venture
Capital Market, supra note 84, at 1084.
170 New Territories,supra note 120.
171 See Gary Dushnitsky & Zur Shapira, Entrepreneurial Finance
Meets Organizational Reality: Comparing Investment Practices and
Performance of Corporate and Independent Venture Capitalists, 31
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 990 (2010).
172 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY

ARE
STAGNATING
(2017),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/US-Public-Eqity-Markets-are-Stagnating.pdf
[perma.cc/4BKB-DCFG].

MARKETS
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six percent) 173 with "tourist" investors, such as hedge funds
and mutual funds, joining the venture capital financing
bandwagon, company valuations spun out of control.174 This,
75
in turn, created the explosion of the unicorn phenomenon.1
Now, private companies with arguably more weight and
influence than some public companies choose to stay private
longer.1 76 There is a dearth of public company offerings and
many companies are unwilling to contemplate a possible
78
down round177 because they view it as a failure.1
Acquisitions are also not likely options for highly valued
private companies since few companies can afford them.
173 See NVCA, Corporate Venture Engagement Rise, supra note 58.

174 See Unusual Suspects: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and Banks
Put the Brakes on Tech Startup Deals, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 15, 2016),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/tech-crossover-investors-slowdown/
[perma.cc/R56Z-YLEC] (noting the effect of crossover or tourist investors,
such as hedge funds and mutual funds during the unicorn boom: in 2015
alone, crossover investors invested more than $40 billion in almost 800
deals related to private technology companies).
175 See Fan, supra note 152 (discussing how the outsized effect of
unicorns on the marketplace necessitates changes in the current
disclosure regime under federal securities laws); Brad Feld, Current
Startup Market Emotional Biases, FELD THOUGHTS (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.feld.comlarchives/2016/04current-startup-market-emotionalbiases.html [perma.cc/HDW5-ES22] (reflecting on Bill Gurley's post and
discussing emotional biases which prevent the unicorns from taking part
in down rounds; Feld urges looking to long-term value rather than paper
value); see also Fred Wilson, Don't Kick the Can Down the Road, AVC
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://avc.com/2016/04/dont-kick-the-can-down-the-road/
[perma.cc/2ZHG-JYJP] (calling for hard decisions to be made now rather
than later regarding unicorns and other startups). For the definition of a
down round, see infra note 177.
176 See Fan, supra note 152, at 637.
177 "A down round occurs in private financing when investors
purchase stock or convertible bonds from a company at a lower valuation
INVESTOPEDIA,
Round,
round."
Down
preceding
than
the
[perma.cc/ 5M6Ahttp://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/downround.asp
E6C6].
178 See Bill Gurley, On the Road to Recap: Why the Unicorn Financing
Market Just Became Dangerous ... for All Involved, ABOVE THE CROWD
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://abovethecrowd.com/2016/04/21/on-the-road-to-recap/
[perma.cc/GP5Y-BDCW].
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Investors in unicorns then turn to the secondary markets for
liquidity; rank and file employees (unlike investors) may not
be able to sell their shares on the secondary markets as they
may be contractually bound from doing so. 179
In the first quarter of 2016, there were no IPOs of venture
capital-backed technology companies;18 0 the technology IPO
market at that time was reminiscent of the numbers during
the Great Recession.1S1 Although IPO activity was up in the
second quarter of 2016 with sixteen IPOs (with eight VCbacked technology companies in this group), the first half of
2016 still lagged significantly behind the first half of 2015
with a forty-one percent drop.18 2 Twilio, a communications
application startup, completed the largest IPO of the

179 Unicorns do this all under the cloak of secrecy since very little
disclosure is required of them. See Fan, supra note 152 (discussing the
adverse consequences of the lack of disclosure required of unicorns).
180 William D. Cohan, Good Luck Getting Out!, FORTUNE (Feb. 1,
2016), http://fortune.com/silicon-valley-tech-ipo-market/ [perma.cc/DH2HPYVQ] (discussing problems with the current way initial public offerings
are conducted). There were, on average, thirty-six VC-backed IPOs per
year from 2012-2014; that number decreased to twenty-three in 2015 with
only seven IPOs occurring in the latter half of the year. Id. Also, the
profitability of technology companies has plummeted-in 2015, the median
EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) for
tech companies was -$9 million. Id.
181 See Alison Griswold, The Market for Tech IPOs Hasn't Been This
Awful
Since the Great Recession, QUARTZ
(Apr.
1, 2016),
http://qz.com/652261/the-market-for-tech-ipos-hasnt-been-this-awful-sincethe-great-recession] [perma.ccIYW6H-FH76]; Rolfe Winkler, For Silicon
Valley, the Hangover Begins, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:12 PM),
http://www.wsj .com/articles/for-silicon-valley-the-hangover-begins1455930769 [perma.cc/KMT4-VSM4] (discussing how once-high-flying
startups are now retrenching); Kevin Dowd, Lackluster Opening for
SecureWorks in First U.S. Tech IPO of 2016, PITCHBOOK (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/lackluster-opening-for-secureworks-infirst-us-tech-ipo-of-20 16
[perma.ccCMY7-ASK9]
(discussing
how
SecureWorks's lackluster opening may dissuade other tech companies
from going public).
182 CB INSIGHTS, THE Hi 2016 GLOBAL TECH EXITS REPORT 5 (2016).
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quarter.183 By the end of 2016, a total of forty-one venturebacked companies had gone public.I8 4 Things started to look
up in 2017 with fifty-eight venture-backed companies going
public, but the expected increase in IPOs after a promising
beginning fizzled.185
On the merger and acquisition front, in the first three
quarters of 2016, "[d]eal flow . . . slowed considerably" and

there were fewer quality companies.18 6 "There have been an
average of [three] $1 [billion plus] exits in tech over the last
six quarters. At this rate, it would take ... [a] two-term
presidency, plus another five years, for all the ... tech

unicorns to exit."18 7
However, if a startup is backed by a CVC, there may be
(1)
following:
the
regarding
outcomes
positive
decisionmaking process of the startup to go public; (2) type of
backing it receives during the IPO process; and (3)
performance of the stock after going public. One study noted
that when startups receive money from corporations they
''are more likely to list their shares than are those
championed by conventional venture groups."1ss In another
study, researchers found that startups with money from
corporations are more likely to attract the attention of
183 Twilio raised $150 million on the first day of its IPO. Corrie
Driebusch, Twilio Raises More than Expected in IPO, WALL ST. J. (June 22,
2016, 7:31 PM), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/twilio-ipo-tests-marketsappetite-for-tech-companies- 1466606076 [perma.cc/45ER-D22R].
184

NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N & PITCHBOOK, 4Q 2017 VENTURE

https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/
(2017),
3
MONITOR
4Q2017PitchBookNVCAVentureMonitor.pdf [perma.cc/5DNY-PLQS].
185 Id.
https://
(2016),
2016
3Q
REPORT
M&A
186 PITCHBOOK,
[perma.cc/EG3Q-FX63]
pitchbook.com/news/reports/3q-2016-ma-report
(noting that the deals that do go through command "outsized multiples").
187 E-mail Newsletter from Marcelo Ballve, Research Director, CB
Insights, to CB Insights subscribers (Sept. 23, 2016, 4:18 PM) (on file with
author).
188 If You Can't Beat Them, Buy Them, supra note 156. In addition,
"[a] bank in Silicon Valley estimated ... that corporate [venture capital]
yields three times the number of patents per dollar invested than in-house
R&D." Id.
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investment banks, equity analysts, and institutional
investors when they go public when compared to those
backed by venture capital funds.189 The researchers further
showed that in the first three years as public companies,
those that were backed by corporate venture capital funds
did better, on average, on stock price performance than such
venture capital funds. 190
Fifth, although not required by the venture capital
financing documents, the venture capital fund "is expected to
make important noncash contributions to the portfolio
company."191 It helps a startup recruit the management
team, intensively monitors the performance of the startup,
and uses its reputation capital to give credibility to the
startup with respect to potential customers, suppliers, and
employees.192 CVCs, on the other hand, offer other nonfinancial contributions, including access to the resources and
opportunities afforded to parent companies of CVCs, possible
collaboration with market development and sales, access to
follow-on funding, and the infrastructure of the corporate
parent.1 9 3 In particular, Dave McClure, who was previously
at 500 Startups, stated that the "primary advantage that
corporate VC has over traditional VC is customers and
distribution."194 However, the problem is that those who run
venture capital funds remain leery of CVCs.

189 See generally Thomas J. Chemmanur et al., Corporate Venture
Capital,Value Creation, and Innovation, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2434 (2014).
190 See id.

191 Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84, at
1072.
192 Id.

193 Robert C. White, Jr., Corporate Venture Capital InvestmentsGood
for
Startups?,
SEC.
EDGE
(Feb.
2,
2016),
http://www.thesecuritiesedge.com/2016/02/corporate-venture-capitalinvestments-good-for-startups/ [perma.ccIUBZ4-DX76].
194 Startups Are the New Corporate R&D, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 13,
2017),
https://www.cbinsights.comlblog/corporate-vc-startup-innovation/
[perma.cc/M7M3-J7YS].
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With notable exceptions, such as Intel Capital1 9 5 and
GV,196 leaders of venture capital funds generally do not hold
corporate venture capitalists in high esteem, derisively
characterizing them as "innovation theater"197 or "dumb
money"19 s because they view CVCs as adding little value and
not being as valuation-sensitive. In fact, some venture
capitalists argue that CVC investments can be harmful to
startups. 199 When Alphabet (formerly Google) initially
considered forming a corporate venture capital arm, it was
not well received. 2 00 Union Square Ventures' Fred Wilson
195

See INTEL CAPITAL, http://www.intelcapital.com/ [perma.cc/UJCS-

NH66].
196 When Google first contemplated a corporate venture capital arm,
noted venture capitalist Fred Wilson, a partner at Union Square Ventures,
one of the most prominent venture capital firms, said:

We like working with corporate investors in the right
situations and we'd certainly love to work with Google
considering all that they bring to the table. But I do think
that venture investing is not the best use of a corporation's
capital and that it is inevitable that it will produce sub-par
returns at best and significant losses at worst. And as a
Google shareholder, I'd prefer to see them do something
else with all that money they are making.
Fred Wilson, Corporate Venture Capital, AVC (July 31, 2008),
Mr.
[perma.cc/22YB-6JAB].
http://avc.comI2008/07/corporate-ventu/
Wilson also states that corporate venture capital can't keep the talent that
it needs; a successful investment is just a one-time gain for the parent
company; and there is a misalignment of the motives of the corporate
venture capital arm on the one hand and the founders, management, and
financial investors on the other. See id.
197 CB Insights Presents: CorporateInnovation Theater in 8 Acts, CB
INSIGHTS (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/corporateinnovation-theatre/ [perma.cc/Q33N-LDAH].
198 Mark Lennon, Corporate Venture Investors Starting to Look a Lot
2013),
(Nov.
5,
TECHCRUNCH
VCs,
Like
Private
More
http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/05/corporate-venture-investors-starting-tolook-a-lot-more-like-private-vcs/ [perma.cc/WE5V-7HJ4].
199 See discussion supra note 196.
200 "'There were some in the venture world who weren't particularly
welcoming to Bill [Maris, head of what was then called Google Ventures,]
or Google Ventures,' recalls John Doerr, a legendary partner at Kleiner
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said as recently as 2016 that when startups take money from
corporations they are "doing business with the devil" and
that "[c]orporate investing is dumb." 201 Mr. Wilson opined,
"These type of investments and relationships have almost
universally 'sucked' for our portfolio companies. The
corporate strategic investor's objectives are generally at odds
with the objectives of the entrepreneur, the company, and
the financial investors. I strongly advise against entering
into these kinds of relationships." 202 He is not alone in his
unfavorable sentiment about CVC. Keith Rabois, a partner
at Khosla Ventures, intimated that GV's ability to lead
rounds in high profile companies was easier because
financial returns did not concern GV.203 He said, it was
"much easier to lead rounds if you don't care about earning a
return."2 04 Bill Gurley, a general partner at another VC firm,
Benchmark Capital, observed, 'There is an inherent paradox
to the notion of corporate venture ...."205 As a result, some
Perkins Caufield & Byers, one of the most important first-generation
California [traditional venture capital] firms." Katrina Brooker, Google
Ventures and the Search for Immortality, BLOOMBERG: MKTS. (Mar. 8,
2015,
9:01
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0309/google-ventures-bill-maris-investing-in-idea-of-living-to-500
[perma.cc/W9WG-PWV2].
201 The History of CVC, supra note 18. In 2013, Fred Wilson said that
he would "never ever ever ever do" a deal with corporate venture
capitalists. The Rise of Corporationsin Tech Venture Capital InvestmentAre Tech VCs Going to Have to Play Nice with Corporate Investors?, CB
INSIGHTS (Sept. 23, 2013), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/tech-corporateventure-capital-balance-sheet! [perma.cc/F2JS-85X5].
202 Fred Wilson, On Corporate VCs, AVC (June 20, 2013),
http://avc.com/2013/06/on-corporate-vcs/ [perma.cc/BC7A-3FEP].
203 See Keith Rabois (@Rabois), TWI'PER (Sept. 22, 2013, 2:40 PM),
https://twitter.com/rabois/status/3818957375056240641
[perma.ccVU7G43RC].
204 Id.
205 Brooker, supra note 200. 'The conflict is, do the fund's loyalties lie

with the startup or with the parent? Just about every independent venture
capitalist in tech has stories of being burned by corporate funds." Id. The
corporation either uses its CVC investment to gather intelligence and
competes with the startup or no longer has an interest and decides not to
fund the startup. Id.
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CVCs, particularly those with no reputation in venture
investing or who are not as well-established, may find it
difficult to syndicate (e.g., put together groups of investors),
which is critical to most venture capital investing.
The implicit contract between general partners and their
portfolio companies is that when the startup transfers
discretion to the general partners, the general partners are
then policed by a reputation market. In other words, since
general partners are repeat players in the venture capital
industry, there is an understanding between them and their
portfolio companies that they will act appropriately and
conform to shared expectations based on previous deals in
the venture capital arena. 20 6 Given that many of the CVCs
are new players in venture capital financings, they do not
have much in the way of reputation capital. Therefore, it is
up to the venture capital funds or entrepreneurs to obtain
information about the CVC since they cannot rely on
reputation capital.
There are three components that are necessary for a
reputation market to operate. First, the party whose
discretion will be policed by the market must anticipate
repeated future transactions. Second, participants must have
shared expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior
by the party to whom discretion has been transferred.
Finally, those who will deal with the advantaged party in the
future must be able to observe whether that party's behavior
20 7
in past dealings conforms to shared expectations.
However, as Part III shows, information is limited in all
these areas for CVCs. As a result, there is a question of how
startups obtain the potential information that they need
about a CVC arm since many of them do not have the same
reputational aspects that venture capital funds do.

206 See Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 84,
1086.
at
207 Id.
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III. CHALLENGES OF CVC IN PRIVATE ORDERING
In Part II, this Article discussed how private ordering
addresses the three major problems of financial contacts:
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism in the
form of agency costs. Specifically, it discussed how CVC
impacts
five
techniques-staged
financing,
control,
compensation, exit, and reliance on implicit contracts (i.e.,
the role of the reputation market)-which have historically
worked well in the venture capital fund and entrepreneur
context. Using five case studies, this Part examines the
challenges facing CVCs with respect to private ordering in
the VC context, highlighting both the promise and perils of

CVC.
A.

GV Case Study

GV is one of the most prolific CVCs-in the seed stage
alone, it is the fourth most active seed investor in all of
venture capital. 208 GV has a formidable array of resources to
entice startups to work with it, including that any startup it
invests in can have access to anyone at Google.209 It also has
a design team that has been likened to a SWAT team for
startups that can troubleshoot any problem a startup may
have. 2 10 GV's diverse investments are illustrated by its
recent exits. 2 11 Under Chesbrough's framework, GV would be
engaging in emergent investments. The startups it invests in
are outside its core business (Google) and instead suggest

208 Since 2010, GV has invested in 135 seed-stage deals making it the
fourth most active seed investor among all venture capital investors. The 5
Most
Active
Seed
Investors,
PITCHBOOK
(May
2,
2016),
http://pitchbook.com/newsletter/the-5-most-active-seed-investors/
[perma.ccU73P-MX3E].
209 See Brooker, supra note 200.

210

Id.

211

Google Strategy Teardown: Betting the Future on A,

Services, and (Tamed) Moonshots, CB INSIGHTS

(Oct. 20,

Cloud

2016),

https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/google-strategy-teardown/#gv/
[perma.cc/E3S3-HLMP].
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2 12
future directions in which the company is heading.
Alphabet Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Alphabet"), is the
public holding company of Google. 2 13 Alphabet's Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016 states, "Google is
not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one
.... [We] make smaller bets in areas that might seem very
speculative or even strange when compared to our current
businesses." 2 14 These bets that they refer to are reported as
"Other Bets" and include GV, along with a few other
businesses that are not part of Google's core business; these
various operating segments are characterized as not
individually material. 2 15 Other Bets is mentioned forty-two
216
times in the Form 10-K, primarily in the financial section.
Other Bets revenue is listed as $327 million in 2014, $445
million in 2015, and $809 million in 2016.217 It had operating
losses of $1.893 billion in 2014, $3.456 billion in 2015, and
$3.578 billion in 2016.218

212 Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204417000008/go
oglO-kq42016.htm [perma.cc/N8EX-8JNUj [hereinafter Alphabet Form 10K].
213 According to the company's Form 10-K,

Alphabet is a collection of businesses-the largest of which,
of course, is Google. It also includes businesses that are
generally pretty far afield of our main Internet products
such as Access, Calico, CapitalG, GV, Nest, Verily, Waymo,
and X. We report all non-Google businesses collectively as
Other Bets. Our Alphabet structure is about helping each
of our businesses prosper through strong leaders and
independence.
Id.
Id.
See id.
216 A search for "Other Bets" in the Form 10-K yielded thirty-five hits.
217 Alphabet Form 10-K, supra note 212, at 24. "Revenues from the
Other Bets are derived primarily through the sales of internet and TV
services through Google Fiber, sales of Nest products and services, and
licensing and R&D services through Verily." Id. at 23.
214
215

218 Id. at 80.
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More specifically, in the risk factors section of its Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016. Alphabet
notes, "[m]aintaining and enhancing the brands of both
Google and Other Bets increases our ability to enter new
categories and launch new and innovative products that
better serve the needs of our users."2 19 This statement
indicates the potential influence that GV's investment in a
particular startup could have for the long-term goals of
Alphabet.220 There was no specific information about GV in
Alphabet's Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31,
2016. However, there were references to "Non-Marketable
Investments," which undoubtedly included GV-related
investments. 22 1
As of June 2017, GV had $2.4 billion in assets under
management of which $167.56 million was "dry powder." 222
In addition, it had a total of 570 investments and 141 exits,
and fifty-one professionals working for GV.223 According to a
PitchBook report, GV's investment preferences are as
follows: (1) its preferred investment amount is between $0.25
million to $50 million; (2) it prefers a minority stake; (3) it
prefers to originate a deal; (4) it will lead a deal; and (5) it

Id. at 13.
220 GV is mentioned in Alphabet's filings with the SEC, but it differs
from most other in-house CVC funds. "The firm makes its investments
independent of its parent's corporate strategy. It can back any company it
wants, whether or not it fits with Google's plans. The fund also can sell its
stakes to whomever it wants, including Google competitors. Facebook and
Yahoo have bought startups funded by [GV]." Brooker, supra note 200.
221 The line item "Purchases of non-marketable investments" in the
Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements is of particular interest
because it indicates the amount of money spent on equity investments and
debt securities. Alphabet Form 10-K, supra note 212, at 46.
222 See
GV,
PITCHBOOK,
https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/
profile_178611086 [hereinafter GV PitchBook Report]. Dry powder is
defined as "a slang term referring to marketable securities that are highly
liquid
and considered
cash-like."
Dry
Powder, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/drypowder.asp
[perma.cc/U637NBWB].
223 See GVPitchBook Report, supra note 222.
219
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will syndicate. 224 This information, however, was not
available in any SEC filing, but through PitchBook, a
comprehensive database that provides information and
analytics about investments. 22 5 This database is a resource
that is only available through a paid subscription and is not
available to (or affordable for) everyone. Although not
required by law to report such information for the benefit of
startups, more transparency helps startups that GV invests
in or is considering investing in to have a better
understanding of how they fit into GV's long-term strategy.
In May 2017, GV invested in a number of startups. The
investments included $15 million in the Series B round of
FullStory, a software company; $50 million in the Series B
round of Magenta Therapeutics, a biotechnology company
and drug developer; and $10 million in the Series A round of
226
Abundant Robotics, an apple-picking robot manufacturer.
Like venture capital funds, GV engages in staged
financing and has disproportionate control compared to its
equity in any given portfolio company. 22 7 It is unclear
whether its compensation structure mimics venture capital
funds. 2 28 GV is not motivated to exit as venture capital funds
are since it does not have limited partners that it needs to
provide substantial returns for. That being said, however, it

224

See id.

See generally PITCHBOOK, https://pitchbook.com/ [perma.cc/8S6KAMYC]. The report generated by PitchBook's platform also contains
information on the parent and sister companies of GV, all investments,
exits and co-investors, stated investment preferences, service providers,
and related news. See GVPitchBook Report, supra note 222.
226 GV PitchBook Report, supra note 222. Alphabet may consider
incorporating this more specific information into its periodic reports in
tabular format as it gives more context to the information it currently
provides on its CVC investments.
227 See generally Google Strategy Teardown, supra note 211.
228 There has been cursory mention of "competitive compensation,"
and "carried interest" but not much in the way of details. See Dan
Primack, Bill Maris Steps Down as CEO of Google Ventures, FORTUNE
(Aug. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/10/bill-maris-google-ventures/
[perma.cc/DS8R-9Z2X].
225
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has among the highest number of exits among CVCs.229
Although initially looked upon with disdain by venture
capital funds, GV is now highly regarded and reputable in
the eyes of the venture capital community. 230 Since it is a
repeat player in the venture capital arena that venture
capital funds want to syndicate with, 2 31 there is an implicit
contract that GV will act how the traditional venture capital
firms have become accustomed to it acting. Also, GV provides
nonfinancial help by providing access to its infrastructure
and talent as noted in the initial description of it above. 232
Although GV acts more like a venture capital fund and
has established a reputation in venture capital given its
longevity, it diverges from a venture capital fund in the
control category of private ordering. As a general matter,
CVCs need to tread carefully when determining the
appropriate number of boards that they can serve on and
what type of decisions they may need to recuse themselves
from. This can help address concerns that governance
procedures are being ignored in the startup context. In the
2009 survey "A Seat at the Table Study" conducted by the
National Venture Capital Association and venture capital
research firm Dow Jones VentureSource,
the two
organizations reported that venture capitalists serve on an
average of 4.4 boards (compared to 4 in 2006), but venture
capitalists believe that 4.6 board seats for early-stage
companies and 5.4 for later-stage companies is ideal; chief
executive officers, in contrast, believe that the ideal number
Analyzing the Top Corporate VCs by Exits-and How Early They
Got
In,
CB
INSIGHTS
(Aug.
27,
2015),
https://www.cbinsights.com/researclhtop-corporate-venture-firms-exits/
[perma.cc/YSK3-FEDM].
230 Compare Richard Waters, Bumbpy Ride for Google Ventures, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/de2 10fe6-9c3b- 1le5-b45d4812f209f861 with Michael Rapoport, What's Behind $3 Billion of
Alphabet's Earnings Gains, WALL ST. J. (April 24, 2018 1:11 PM),
https:/blogs.wsj .com/moneybeat/2018/04/24/whats-behind-3-billion-ofalphabets-earnings- gain.
231 See Google Strategy Teardown, supra note 211.
229

232

Id.
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of board seats for VCs is 3.8 seats for early-stage companies
and 4.2 for later-stage companies. 23 3 GV typically gets a seat
on the board as an investor in a private company. Out of the
"Top 25 Board Seats" in a PitchBook report on GV, only
three were board observers; the remaining twenty-two were
voting board seats. 2 34 One of the general partners of GV,
Andrew Wheeler, is on seven of the "Top 25 Board Seats"
representing GV's interests; 2 35 Mr. Wheeler serves on the
boards of thirteen companies in the aggregate. 2 36 In light of
the increasing complexity of private companies (e.g., Uber
and other unicorns) and startups staying private longer, the
question is whether service on such a high number of boards
remains manageable. Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White
observed, "As the latest batch of [startups] mature, generate
revenue, achieve significant valuations, but stay private, it is
important to assess whether they are likewise maturing
control
and
internal
governance
structures
their
environments to match their size and market impact."2 37 She
suggested that startups should look at expanding board
seats to include those who have had experience with large

233 Scott Austin, New Study Peers into Venture-Backed Company
Boardroom, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Nov. 10, 2009, 7:58
AM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.comlventurecapital/2009/11/10/new-study-peers-intoventure-backed-company-boardroom! [perma.cc/L88X-JE79].
234 See GVPitchBook Report, supra note 222.
235 See id. Note that the report only covers the top twenty-five board
seats-he could be on more since GV has 501 total investments. Richard
Miner, another General Partner of GV, sits on four of the top twenty-five
boards and Krishna Yeshwant, yet another General Partner of GV, sits on
two. See id.
https://my-pitchbookWheeler,
PITCHBOOK,
236 See
Andrew
coml#page/profile793205757.
237 Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Keynote Address at the
SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar.
31,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valleyprivate
(discussing
[perma.cc/X7XG-D6UP]
initiative-3- 31-16.htmll
companies-with particular references to unicorns-and the role of SEC
rules and regulatory actions to foster innovation while protecting
investors).
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companies and public companies. 2 38 In this manner, having
board members designated by CVCs may be helpful since
they provide a public company perspective that board
members representing a venture capital fund typically
cannot. Additionally, she stressed the importance of having
board members with the appropriate regulatory and
financial expertise, including those with relevant industry
expertise to ensure differing viewpoints and the ability to
spot critical issues.239
Part of what private ordering strives to do is prevent
opportunistic behavior by either the entrepreneur or venture
capital fund through the five techniques discussed earlier.
There may be more of a danger of opportunistic behavior and
potential conflicts of interest for CVCs, however, since they
do not have the same motivations as venture capital funds.
For example, Alphabet has developed autonomous driving
vehicles and has invested heavily (through GV) in
competitors in the space, such as Uber. 2 40 Interestingly,
David Krane, the managing partner and CEO of GV, sat on
Uber's board. 241 Although Mr. Krane has very close ties to
Alphabet-he was one of Google's first 100 employees and
has been involved with a number of Google's $1 billion plus
exits-he remained a member of the Uber board until
recently. 242 The conflicts have only intensified in recent

238 See id.
239 See id.

240 See E-mail Newsletter from Kerry Wu, Auto Tech Industry
Analyst, CB Insights, to Auto Tech Insights by CB Insights subscribers
(Sept. 1, 2016, 8:33 PM) (on file with author); Mikey Tom, Alphabet, Uber
Set
to
Go
Head-to-Head, PITCHBOOK
(Aug.
30,
2016),
http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/alphabet-and-uber-set-to-go-head-tohead/ [perma.ccU78J-7P2J]; Mark Bergen, Google Ventures' New Chief,
David Krane, Is the Uberconnector, RECODE (Aug. 12, 2016, 2:10 PM),
http://www.recode.net/2016/8/12/12445218/google-ventures-david-kraneconnector
[perma.cc/E349-4S89];
Uber
Technologies, PITCHBOOK,
https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/profile_1141265663
[hereinafter
Uber
PitchBook Report].
241 See Uber PitchBook Report, supra note 240.
242 See Bergen, supra note 240.
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months. Waymo, which recently spun-out from Alphabet,
filed a lawsuit against one of GV's portfolio companies, Uber,
alleging theft of trade secrets and intellectual property and
patent infringement of Waymo's LiDAR technology by Otto,
which was acquired by Uber on August 18, 2016.243
B.

Intel Capital Case Study

Intel Capital, a Delaware corporation and wholly-owned
subsidiary of Intel Corporation ("Intel"),2 44 is one of the most
prolific investors in the corporate venture capital world.
Under Chesbrough's framework, Intel Capital is making
enabling investments. It invests in startups that will expand
the ecosystem of companies that use Intel's products. Despite
that fact, Intel's Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
2 5
December 31, 2016 does not mention Intel Capital at a11 4
and there is an oblique reference to investments in the risk
factors section.2 46 Since it began in 1991, "Intel Capital has
243 Romain Dillet, Uber Acquires Otto to Lead Uber's Self-Driving Car
https://techcrunch.coml
18,
2016),
(Aug.
TECHCRUNCH
Effort,
2016/08/18/uber-acquires-otto-to-lead-ubers-self-driving-car-effort-reportsays/ [perma.cc/QQ68-YTZG]; Daisuke Wakabayshi, Uber and Waymo
Settle Trade Secret Suit Over Driverless Cars, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/O9/technology/uber-waymo-lawsuitdriverless.html. "LiDAR" stands for "light detection and ranging." What is
ADMIN.,
ATMOSPHERIC
AND
OCEANIC
NAT'L
LIDAR?,
[perma.cc/9WRF- 6AZ8].
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/factsflidar.html/
LiDAR has risen to the forefront as a piece of technology to further the
development of self-driving cars.
244 Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 21.1 (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086317000012/ex21
112312016q4.html/ [perma.ccI3SXV-BTQZ].
Corp.,. Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 17, 2017),
245 Intel
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086317000012/
[hereinafter
[perma.cc/9MNM-APU9]
al0kdocument12312016q4.html/
Intel Corp. Form 10-K].
246 In the "Risk Factors" section under the subheading, "We are
subject to risks associated with transactions[," Intel states:

We invest in companies around the world that we believe
will further our strategic objectives, stimulate growth in
the digital economy, create new business opportunities for

No. 2:3411

CATCHING DISRUPTION

invested about $12.2 billion in 1,500 companies" in fiftyseven countries across a range of sectors including security,
wearable technology and digital media, according to the
company's website. 2 47 It is also the leading investor (among
institutional venture capital investors and CVCs) in certain
areas, such as the cybersecurity space. 248 In addition, Intel
has invested heavily in the drone space and is the top CVC
investor in the robotics realm. 2 49 Intel's R&D as a percentage
of net revenue was 21.4 percent, equating to $12.740
billion. 250 It is unclear whether Intel Capital is included in
the R&D number.
Intel Capital has been at the forefront of venture capital
investments in newer areas, such as the Internet of Things
("IoT"); it has invested in seventeen IoT deals since 2010.251
Intel, and generate financial returns. Our investments
take different forms, including acquisition of companies to
further advance our strategic objectives ....
Id. at 21.
247 Our Advantage, INTEL
CAPITAL,
http://www.intelcapital.com/
advantage/index.html [perma.cc/ZVB5-HHD C].
248 The Most Active Cybersecurity VC Investors and Their Investments
in
One
Infographic,
CB
INSIGHTS
(Aug.
3,
2016),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/cybersecurity-most-active-investorinfographic/ [perma.cc/T8YM-4CKA].
249 See E-mail Newsletter from Anand Sanwal, CEO & Co-Founder,
CB Insights, to CB Insights subscribers (Oct. 6, 2016, 4:05 PM) (on file
with author).
250 Intel Corp. Form 10-K, supra note 245, at 27.
251 Internet of Things refers to the "concept of ... connecting any
device with an on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other)."
Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of "'he Internet of Things', FORBES:
LEADERSHIP
(May
13,
2014,
12:05
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanationinternet-things-that-anyone-can-understand [https://web.archive.org/web/
20180203124208/https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan2014l05/13/sim
ple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand].
Since 2010,
844 investors have participated in at least one IoT deal; $1.22 billion was
invested in 199 deals. Adley Bowen, A Pile of Dead Unicorns Is Not
Around
the
Corner,
PrTCHBOOK
(May
9,
2016),
http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/a-pile-of-dead-unicorns-is-not-aroundthe-corner [perma.ccJNH8U-4YF5]. Two other CVCs were in the top five

COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 2018

It has been quite active in the drone space as well. 2 52 Intel's
corporate venture capital investments are noted in five
sections in its Form 10-K: Risk Factors; Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results
of Operations; Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures
About Market Risk; Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows;
and Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. However,
the Form 10-K does not tie those investments explicitly to
Intel Capital. 2 53 It states in part, "We regularly invest in
non-marketable equity instruments of private companies,
which range from early-stage companies that are often still
defining their strategic direction to more mature companies
254
with established revenue streams and business models."
Intel reported that the carrying value of its non-marketable
equity investment portfolio amounted to $4.4 billion as of
December 31, 2016255 and specified that such investments
A
were "classified within other long-term assets . *..."256
number of items fall under long-term assets and only after
reviewing the Form 10-K several times, did the author
discover that the information about CVC investments was

for IoT investments: Cisco Investments was tied with Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers for second place and Qualcomm Ventures was tied for
fifth place with Kima Ventures. See id.
252 Intel Capital, Airware's Commercial Drone Fund (a venture arm
for Airware, a drone startup), and GV were tied for second most active
CVCs. See Qualcomm, Intel, and Google Ventures Among the Top
Corporates Betting on Drones, CB INSIGHTS (May 10, 2016),
https://www.cbinsights.comfblog/drone-startups-corporate-investment/
[perma.cc/RT34-DE7F]. Qualcomm Ventures was also noted as another
corporate venture arm increasingly active in the drone space; it was
ranked the top CVC in this space. See id. In 2012, only one CVC
participated in a drone-related startup; by 2015 the number of deals had
dramatically increased. See id. Most of the more recent deals were focused
on seed or Series A stages (partially because there were no later stage
deals since it is a relatively new area of investment). See id.
253 Intel Corp. Form 10-K, supra note 245.
254 Id. at 60.
255 This number excludes equity derivatives. Id.
256

Id.
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buried in the section
addressing
equity
method
investments. 2 57
Although Intel provided some information about its
investments in private companies, it was somewhat opaque
and obscure. As was the case with GV, the most pertinent
information came from a non-publicly available source,
PitchBook. According to PitchBook, Intel Capital has $1.30
billion in assets under management, a total of 1610
investments, and 705 exits. 2 58 There are seventy-nine
professionals who work at Intel Capital, and a management
team that oversees it.259 In any given month, Intel Capital
may have a number of investments at different stages of the
portfolio companies. For example, in May 2017, Intel Capital
invested almost $84 million in three different ventures,
including $65.32 million in the later stage Series B round of
Peloton Technology, an automated vehicle technology
company specializing in freight transportation.260
Despite the fact that Intel Capital has been doing CVC
investments longer than most corporations, it does not
always subscribe to the private ordering framework. For
example, it may not stage its financings which may impact
the portfolio's company's particular expectations as well as
the venture capital funds that may be investing alongside
Intel Capital. Intel Capital may decide to fund the company
in one big round like they did in the case of Cloudera, a
257 The equity method "is an accounting technique used by firms to
assess the profits earned by their investments in other companies." Equity
Method,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
e/equitymethod.asp/ [perma.cc/JQP4-UJ6M]. It is commonly used "when
one company has significant influence over another. When a company
holds approximately twenty to twenty-five percent or more of another
company's stock, it is considered to have significant control, which
signifies the power one company can exert over another company. This
power includes representation on the board of directors." Id.
258 Intel
Capital,
PITCHBOOK,
https://my-pitchbookcom/#page/profile_402709779 (last visited April 25, 2018) [hereinafter
Intel CapitalPitchBook Report].
259 See id.
260

See

id.
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software company, which went public in 2017.261 This, in
turn, skews the valuation of the company. Cloudera
ultimately ended up going public at a valuation below the
valuation at which Intel Capital invested. 2 62 It is also
unclear how intensively Intel Capital monitors its portfolio
companies or provides its marketing and infrastructure
might to them. Since Intel Capital falls under Chesbrough's
enabling investments category, its main motivation is to
build up its ecosystem of potential customers, not to
necessarily help the company with an exit.2 6 3 Therefore, like
with most CVCs, the lack of impetus to exit in some ways
misaligns their goals with the venture capital funds and
entrepreneurs. With respect to the compensation question,
there are no publicly available sources that detail how Intel
Capital compensates those who invest on their behalf.
However, given that Intel Capital is a wholly-owned
subsidiary, those that make the investment decisions most
likely receive carried interest. 2 64 Lastly, like GV, Intel

Cloudera Posts Long-Awaited IPO Filing,
Roof,
Katie
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 31, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/31/clouderaposts-long-awaited-ipo-filing/ [perma.cc/47A3-V83M].
262 Cloudera had a valuation of $4.1 billion after its Series F round in
2014, but was valued at about $1.9 billion at IPO. Id.; Cromwell
Schubarth, Cloudera Raises $225M in IPO that Tops Target but Slashes
Valuation, SILICON VALLEY Bus. J. (Apr. 28, 2017, 6:20 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2017/04/27/cloudera-raises225m-in-ipo-that-tops-targets-but.html/ [perma.cc/4XRG-8RSD].
263 See discussion supra Section II.C and accompanying notes
describing Chesbrough's framework.
264 See discussion supra Section II.C and accompanying notes
detailing the different rationales for structuring a CVC in a particular
manner. In a study done in 2013, the discrepancy between CVCs and
venture capital firms was stark. "[In 2013], [c]orporate venturing unit
leaders on average earn[ed] $304,250 a year, with a further $164,865 as
cash bonus. A similar 2012 survey by bank JPMorgan and J
Thelander Consulting found the top-ranking financial venture capitalist
(VC) at a firm managing less than $1bn earned $541,329 on average in the
2011-12 period with a bonus of $868,092." James Mawson, Spotlight on
9,
2013),
(Sept.
VENTURING
CORP.
Compensation, GLOBAL
261
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Capital has good standing in the reputation market because
venture capital funds believe they are dealing with a known
quantity given the involvement of Intel Capital in a high
number of deals over a few decades' time.
C.

Acre Venture Partners Case Study

The food industry is undergoing tremendous change right
now-some even say a revolution.265 Every year, an
increasing number of new products proliferate in the
marketplace.266 The dollar amount that corporate venture
capital invested in the consumer packaged goods ("CPG")
space increased by a multiple of eight from 2011 to 2015 and
well-known corporate players play a significant role. 267 More
http://www.globalcorporateventuring.com/article.php/6966/spotlight-oncompensation/ [perma.ccIAS2V-ZWTJ].
265 'The food industry is in a time of revolution,' said Campbell Soup
President and CEO Denise Morrison." Brian Sozzi, Amid Food Revolution,
Campbell Starts $125 Million Venture Fund, THESTREET (Feb. 17, 2016,
1:08
PM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/13461909/1/amid-foodrevolution-campbell-soup-starts- 125-million-venture-fund.html/
[perma.cc/Y2P2-A6KL]. "Referring to the packaged-food industry as being
in the middle of a 'period of revolutionary change,' Chief Executive Officer
Denise Morrison ... cited major cultural changes, changes in the size of
American households, and a growing movement toward simpler foods and
organics." Brian Sozzi, Campbell's Soup CEO: "I Have Never Seen Industry
Conditions Like Today," THESTREET (July 22, 2015, 7:36 PM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/13227872/l/campbells-soup-ceo-i-havenever-seen-industry-conditions-like-today.htmll [perma.cc/XQ2H-PZZ7].
266 See CB INSIGHTS WEBINAR: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
OF
CONSUMER PACKAGED GOODS: WHAT'S CHANGING TODAY, WHO'S DOING IT,
AND
WHAT
THE
FUTURE
HOLDS
slide
40
(2016),
http://www.slideshare.net/CBInsights/the-changing-landscape-ofconsumer-packaged-goods/
[perma.cc/VN3M-YPXV]
[hereinafter
CB
INSIGHTS WEBINAR] (graph showing increase in new food and non-food
products in the consumer packaged goods space).
267 Big CPG Corporates: Where They're Investing in Food, Personal
Care,
Tech,
and
More,
CB
INSIGHTS
(Apr.
25,
2016),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/consumer-packaged-goods-startup-bets/
[perma.cc/L7RY-GWVQ]
(mentioning Coca-Cola Company, Unilever,
General Mills, and Anheuser-Busch as active investors in and acquirers of
private companies with a quarter of the investments in private companies
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than $6 billion in funding has been invested in 400 food
startups since 2010.268 Unsurprisingly, the top acquirers of
2 69
these startups are large corporations.
To cite one example of this change, this Article will
discuss how Campbell Soup Company, a New Jersey
corporation ("Campbell Soup"), became involved in corporate
venture capital. In an attempt to innovate in the evercompetitive CPG space, Campbell Soup launched fourteen
new products (both beverages and dressings) under its
Bolthouse Farms brand in the spring of 2015, and also
announced plans to expand its 1915 organic fresh pressed
juice brand. 2 7o In August 2015, Campbell Soup launched
three new organic, non-genetically modified chicken noodle
varieties aimed at kids.271 Despite these efforts to make
themselves relevant, Campbell Soup decided that it needed
to innovate in a different way.
In February 2016, Campbell Soup announced the
formation of Acre Venture Partners, a Delaware limited
partnership ("Acre Venture Partners"), intending to make
venture capital investments in innovative new companies in
food and food-related industries. Campbell Finance 2 Corp.,
an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Campbell, is the sole

by these players to seed, angel, or Series A rounds and sixty mergers and
acquisition transactions from 2011 to 2015).
268 Annie Gasparro, Campbell Invests $125 Million in Project to Fund
PM),
9:09
2016,
17,
(Feb.
J.
Food Startups, WALL ST.
http://www.wsj.comlarticles/campbell-invests- 125-million-in-project-tofund-food-startups-1455750400/ [perma.cc/9U3Z-TQNC].
269 CB INSIGHTS WEBINAR, supra note 266, at slide 19. Note that
innovation in the CPG space does not come from R&D; compared to
advertising costs, R&D is a small expenditure. Id. at slide 28.
Interestingly, CPG corporates (not necessarily CVCs) increasingly
invested in CPG startups in 2014, 2015 and Q1 '16 once non-CPG
corporates such as GV and Comcast Ventures did so. CPG Is Still Hot:
100+ Deals in Q1'16, Corporates ParticipateMore, CB INSIGHTS (May 15,
https://www.cbinsights.com/reasearch/cpg-startup-financing-ql2016),
2016/ [https://perma.cc/S5QY-7C7G].
270 Sozzi, Amid Food Revolution, supra note 265.
271 Sozzi, Campbell's Soup CEO, supra note 265.
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limited partner of Acre Venture Partners. 27 2 Under
Chesbrough's framework, Campbell Soup makes driving
investments meaning that its investments in CPG startups
are tightly linked to its strategic and operational goals.
Acre Ventures GP, manages Acre Venture Partners,
which is independent of Campbell Soup. 2 73 Jeff Dunn,
president of the company's Campbell Fresh division, is the
Campbell Soup representative on the investment committee
of Acre. 274 Campbell Soup agreed to make a $125 million
capital commitment to Acre Venture Partners. 2 75
Acre Venture Partners has made multiple recent
investments. As an example, it invested $40 million in the
later stage Series C round of Farmer's Business Network, an
analytic and data management company for farms. It also
invested $20 million in the early stage round of Evolve
BioSystems, a provider of microbiome-based products.276
By creating a corporate venture capital arm, Campbell
Soup is positioning itself to be a part of the food revolution
for healthier foods. General Mills, Inc., a Delaware
corporation 277 and a competitor of Campbell Soup, had
started developing newer products through one of its
business units, 301 Inc., to address consumers' desire for
healthy foods. Ultimately, however, 301 Inc. shifted its focus

272
273
274

Sozzi, Amid Food Revolution, supra note 265.
Id.
Id.

275 Id. See also Campbell Soup Company, Quarterly Report (Form 10Q)
(June 7,
2016),
at 20,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/16732/000001673216000124/cpb-512016x10q.htm
[perma.ccJUU3NNTZ5] (noting that through May 1, 2016, Campbell Soup funded $26
million of the $125 million capital commitment and that the company has
no further financial obligations to Acre Venture Partners except for the
remaining $99 million).
276

See

Acre

Venture

Partners,

PITCHBOOK,

https://my.pitchbook.com/#page/profile_1981226419 (on file with author).
277 See generally General
Mills, Annual Report (Form 10-K)
(July
6,
2015),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40704/
000119312515245476/d947722d10k.htm
[perma.cc/7Q2P-EX2Y]
(highlighting material information regarding General Mills).
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away from internal R&D to investments in regional
startups. 2 78 Kellogg Company also recently launched a "food
2 79
tech-focused venture fund" called Eighteen94 Capital.
Notably, despite the fact that Campbell Soup, Kellogg,
and General Mills all largely focus on making investments in
traditional food startups, each differed in the manner in
which they set up their corporate venture capital arms. In
October 2016, Campbell Soup became the sole investor in
Habit, a nutrition-focused startup that tailors personal
nutrition recommendations based on a person's body
biology. 280 This new investment deviates from how Campbell
In July 2015, General Mills implemented a new strategy for one of
its business units, 301 Inc. See John Kell, General Mills Is Starting a VC
AM),
8:34
2015,
22,
(Oct.
Food Startups, FORTUNE
for
[perma.cc/
http://fortune.com/2015/10/22/general-mills-vc-small-food
4KLM-67KZ]. 301 Inc. had existed for three years and was originally
intended to develop small, disruptive brands internally-now, the plan is
for 301 Inc. to invest in small regional startups that seek capital to grow.
See id. John Haugen, vice president and general manager of 301 Inc.
stated, "We have found that more and more innovation was coming from
278

small companies ...

. There were ways for us to partner and provide

growth capital." Id. (internal quotations omitted). There are three factors
that will be considered by 301 Inc. when it considers whether to invest in a
startup: (1) gives General Mills an opportunity to compete in new
categories; (2) allows certain deals to be structured in a way that would
allow General Mills to acquire the startup in the future; and (3) meets
certain financial metrics and goals. See id. (author noted that being an
early investor and nurturing the brand of a startup is much cheaper than
having to pay hefty price tags on acquisitions such as General Mills'
acquisition of the natural food company, Annie's, for $820 million in 2014).
279 E-mail Newsletter from Marcelo Ballve, Research Director, CB
Insights, to CB Insights subscribers (June 24, 2016, 11:26 AM) (on file
with author).
280 John Kell, Campbell Soup Invests in Nutrition Tech Startup,
FORTUNE (Oct. 26, 2016, 2:23 PM), http://fortune.com]2016/10/26/campbellsoup-invests-habit/ [perma.cc/4B8P-MKZ3]. Habit "uses data from an athome test kit to make personalized food recommendations tailored to an
individual's unique DNA-" Id. Denise Morrison, Campbell CEO and
President, said, "Campbell's investment is part of our broader efforts to
define the future of food, which requires fresh thinking, new models of
innovation, smart external development, and venture investing to create
an ecosystem of innovative partners." Id.
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Soup's competitors are investing. In addition, Campbell Soup
invested right off of its balance sheet rather than through its
CVC arm. 28 1 This indicates a shift away from a driving
investment model to one that may be more appropriately
characterized as emergent. Put differently, Campbell Soup is
trying to predict where future trends may be headed so that
it can position itself to pivot accordingly.
The structure of Campbell's corporate venture capital
arm is distinctly different than the other CVCs mentioned so
far. First, although Acre Venture Partners is funded by
Campbell Soup, a general partner outside of the parent
company, Acre Ventures GP, manages the fund.282 Second,
the sole limited partner of Acre Venture Partners is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Campbell Soup.283 The structure
suggests that Campbell Soup284 may want to operate in
stealth mode as it makes investments in private
companies-at least until it strategically makes sense for the
parent company to do otherwise. Note 15 to the Consolidated
Financial Statements in Campbell Soup's Form 10-K for the
year ended July 31, 2016 provides details on its $125 million
capital commitment to Acre. It states that Campbell Soup's
"share of earnings (loss) is calculated according to the terms
of the partnership agreement. Acre is a [variable interest
entity]."285 Campbell Soup characterizes the third-party
ownership as a noncontrolling interest. 28 6 As is the case with
the previous examples, the parent company reports very
281 In doing CVC research, it was never made clear why certain
companies invested off their balance sheets versus a stand-alone corporate
venture capital arm.
282 Campbell
Soup
Co.,
Annual
Report
(Form
10-K)
(Sept.
20,
2016),
at
62,
https://www.sec.gov/Arcbives/edgar/
data/16732/000001673216000146/cpb- 7312016xlOxk.htm [perma.cc/C8KDB4C2] [hereinafter Campbell Soup Co. Form 10-K].
283

Id.

As of February 16, 2018, Campbell Soup Company had a market
cap of $13.879 billion. Campbell Soup Company (CPB), YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=CPB [perma.cc/8RYZ-HDW7].
285 See Campbell Soup Co. Form 10-K, supra note 282, at 62.
284

286

See id.
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basic information about its corporate venture capital
investment activity. The only way one may glean that
information is to read information from non-publicly
available sources or information on media websites.
Based on the limited information available about Acre
Venture Partners in both the media and public filings, as
well as its relative newness, this particular CVC illustrates
how the lack of public knowledge about it may stymie its
efforts to be part of the venture capital landscape. It has no
reputation market other than one based on its parent
company, Campbell Soup Company, and there is not enough
information for either an entrepreneur or venture capital
fund to determine whether it will stage its investments. One
can surmise, however, that unless Campbell Soup puts more
money into Acre Venture Partners or makes bigger bets on
the startups it does invest in, it will be relegated to a minor
role. Therefore, its impact on private ordering may be
minimal.
D. Well Ventures Case Study
Well Ventures, a Delaware LLC ("Well Ventures"), is a
Inc.
Alliance,
Boots
Walgreens
of
subsidiary
("Walgreens"), 287 "a global pharmacy-led health and
wellbeing enterprise." 28 8 Well Ventures either has board or

287 Walgreens Boots Alliance, Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex.-21
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1618921/
2016),
20,
(Oct.
[hereinafter
[perma.cc/57PQ-THCN]
000114036116083198/ex21.htm
Walgreens Form 10-K].
288 Id. at 59. There are three different segments of its operations:
Retail Pharmacy USA, Retail Pharmacy International and Pharmaceutical
Wholesale. See id. at Section 19, Segment Reporting, for additional
discussion. By way of background, "[o]n December 31, 2014, Walgreens
Boots Alliance became the successor of Walgreen Co. ('Walgreens')
pursuant to a merger designed to effect a reorganization of Walgreens into
a holding company structure (the 'Reorganization)." Id. at 54. As a result,
"Walgreens became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Walgreens Boots
Alliance, a newly-formed Delaware corporation, and each issued and
outstanding share of Walgreens common stock, par value $0.078125,
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observer seats in its portfolio companies and typically invests
up to $5 million in such companies. 2 89 Under Chesbrough's
framework, Walgreens engages in driving investments
because its investments are tightly linked to its operations
and strategies. It prefers to exit within four to eight years. 2 90
While there are vague references to strategic investments,
Well Ventures 29 1 is not mentioned in Walgreen's Form 10-K
or Form 10-Q. 292 Instead, the only potential reference to Well
Ventures is that Walgreens invests in businesses that are
complementary to its own businesses or that can further its
growth strategies. 2 93 The Form 10-K then states that these
converted on a one-to-one basis into Walgreens Boots Alliance common
stock, par value $0.01." Id.
289 Company
Overview
of
Well
Ventures,
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/researchstocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapld
=266098258 [perma.cc/2FPX-GYMB].
290 See id.
291 Founded in 2009, Well Ventures is described as "the venture and
growth capital investment arm of Walgreen Co." with a focus on being "the
preeminent strategic investor and partner for companies with disruptive
technologies, products, and services that align with Walgreens' mission
to 'help
people
get,
stay,
and
live
well."' Walgreens:
Well
Ventures, https://web. archive.orgweb/20151025144221/http://www.walgre
ens.com/topic/well-ventures/well-ventures-info.jsp (archived
Oct.
25,
2015) (emphasis omitted).
292 See generally Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., Quarterly Report
(Form
10-Q) (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1618921/000161892117000026/wba-2017228x10q.htm/
[perma.cc/
A3WR-47BG]; Walgreens Form 10-K, supra note 288.
293 The full text of the relevant section reads:
Our growth strategy is partially dependent upon
acquisitions,
joint ventures
and
other
strategic
investments, some of which may not prove to be successful.
We have grown, in part, through acquisitions in recent
years and expect to continue to acquire or invest in
businesses that build on or are deemed complementary to
our existing businesses or further our growth strategies...
Acquisitions, joint ventures and strategic investments
involve numerous other risks, including potential exposure
to unknown liabilities, as well as undetected internal
control, regulatory or other issues, or additional costs not
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strategic investments involve risk and may materially
adversely affect Walgreens business operations, financial
2 94
condition or results of operations.
As is the case with the other public companies discussed,
29 5
Walgreens has a significant market cap-$75.801 billion.
Well Ventures has not publicly disclosed the funds allocated
to it by Walgreens. 296 In addition, one cannot merely look at
the dollar amount to determine what type of influence or
impact the CVC is having on the parent company as a whole.
Well Ventures differs from GV and Acre Venture Partners in
that it is a subsidiary of Walgreens (like Intel Capital). The
venture capital portfolio of Well Ventures has over a dozen
companies across its focus areas; however, for "strategic
reasons," Well Ventures does not publicize all of them. 29 7 If a
anticipated at the time the transaction was completed. No
assurance can be given that our acquisitions, joint ventures
and other strategic investments will be successful and will
not materially adversely affect our business operations,
financial condition or results of operations.
Walgreens Form 10-K, supra note 287, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
294 See id.
295 Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=WBA [perma.cc/FUD2-2MUC].
Despite thorough research into the amount allocated to Well
296
Ventures, the author was unable to locate this information.
Ventures, BLOOMBERG,
Company Overview of Well
297 See
https://www.bloomberg.com/researcl/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapl
d=266098258 [perma.cc/TYB7-CZB5]. Bloomberg lists the types of
startups Well Ventures has invested in. It also notes Well Ventures'
typical investment and exit strategy. The web page does not, however, list
the amount of Well Ventures' investment. "[Well Ventures] portfolio
companies include such ventures as the creator of a consumer sleep apnea
device, and a solar energy company that specializes in the energy needs of
multi-site retailers." Jeremy Quittner, What's Really Driving the Boom in
2014),
8th,
(Aug.
INC.COM
Firms,
VC
Corporate
http://www.inc.com/j eremy-quittner/corporate-venture-capital-drivesinnovation-for-big-companies.html [perma.cc/4RUV-CSQH]. Well Ventures
can be the lead for a financing or part of a syndicate; they prefer coinvesting with institutional investors that they collaborate with.
VENTURES,
WELL
WALGREENS:
Criteria,
Evaluation
https://web.archive.org/web/20151026172717/http://www.walgreens.com/to
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deal is admittedly strategic to (presumably) the parent
company, then it logically follows that the investments Well
Ventures makes could potentially play a critical role for
Walgreens and are therefore material. In Walgreens' Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2016, there is a
reference to equity investments in other companies in its
"Risk Factors" section. "From time to time, we make debt or
equity investments in other companies that we may not
control or over which we may not have sole control."2 98 It
also acknowledges the risks of operating in businesses that
differ from their primary lines of business or which operate
in different geographic markets.299 Furthermore, Walgreens
states that it relies on the internal controls and financial
reporting controls of these companies in which, they have
non-controlling interests and that such entities "failure to
maintain effectiveness or comply with applicable standards
may materially and adversely affect [themi."300
Like Acre Venture Partners, Well Ventures is a relative
newcomer to venture capital financings. From a private
ordering perspective, it appears that its stated exit goals are
somewhat in the timeframe of a venture capital fund since it
intends to exit within four to eight years (in contrast to seven
to ten for the venture capital fund). From a compensation
perspective, those that invest on behalf of Well Ventures
may receive carried interest since that is typically why CVCs
are structured as wholly-owned subsidiaries. 30 1 This type of
compensation would also align the incentives between Well
Ventures and the venture capital fund. Since it takes both
board observer and board seats, Well Ventures' impact on its
portfolio companies will differ in terms of impact. A seat on
pic/well-ventures/evaluation-criteria.jsp [perma.cc/6YXL-849P] (archived
Oct. 26, 2015). For each portfolio company, Well Ventures requests board
observer seats. Id.
298 Walgreens Form 10-K, supranote 287, at 15.
299
300

Id.
Id.

301 See discussion supra Section II.C and accompanying notes
(specifying the rationale behind the different legal structures of CVCs).
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the board gives Well Ventures a vote in the portfolio
company whereas being a board observer only gives it access
to certain financial information which is based on the terms
of the Investors' Rights Agreement. Through a designated
board member, Well Ventures would have a greater impact
on the control aspect of private ordering. It would be more
involved in monitoring the company, and, perhaps, it would
provide nonfinancial assistance to help the company to move
forward-whether in the form of marketing or offering
expertise in a particular area that is beneficial to the
portfolio company.
E.

General Motors Ventures Case Study

The year 2015 was a record year for financing deals for
automotive-related startups. 30 2 Funding increased by 154
percent and deals saw a jump of fifty-eight percent. 303 In
2016, funding to the sector continued unabated and saw
another increase. The amount of investments into private
companies in the auto tech space in 2016 totaled $1.102
302 Big Auto's Startup Bets: Where They're Investing Across Al,
Mapping, Automation, and Materials, CB INSIGHTS (May 11, 2016),
https://www.cbinsights.comblog/auto-corporates-investing-startups/
[perma.cc/2YEA-ZQXU]. Major automakers are playing defense as
startups encroach on their territory. See E-mail Newsletter from Kerry
Wu, Auto Tech Industry Analyst, CB Insights, to Auto Tech Insights by
CB Insights subscribers (July 14, 2016, 7:29 PM) (on file with author).
Companies are fighting back by actively investing in autotech startups
through CVCs or the parent companies themselves to the tune of $450
million as of June 2016. See id. A record-breaking year in investments is a
strong possibility if the current pace of investment continues.
303 Foot on the Gas: 2015 Sets Record for Deals in Auto Tech, CB

INSIGHTS

(Apr.

1,

2016),

https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/auto-tech-

startups-funding-2015/ [perma.cc/9NG4-47XA]. Autotech startups were on
a record-breaking pace for funding. For the first half of 2016, $450 million
was invested in this area. Recently, one of General Motors' rivals, Ford,
invested $6.6 million in a startup. Gina Hall, Autotech Startups Set a
Record Pace for Funding in 2016, SILICON VALLEY Bus. J.: TECHFLASH
(July 18, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjoselblog/
techflash/2016/07/autotech-startups-set-a-record-pace-for-funding.html
[perma.cc/CLY7-MPUE].
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billion. 30 4 By May 2017, investments surpassed that amount,
with forty-nine deals equaling $1.307 billion.305
In order to secure their own futures while simultaneously
addressing challenges such as the rise of electric vehicles
and driverless cars, major auto manufacturers have become
active investors in venture capital deals. 306 General Motors
Company, a Delaware corporation ("General Motors"),307 like
much of the auto industry, is in a transformative time. It is
moving from manufacturing and selling cars to the business
of mobility. 30 8
In 2010, General Motors established a Delaware
subsidiary,
General
Motors
Ventures
LLC
("GM
3
0
9
Ventures")
for the purpose of pursuing venture capital
investments in the automotive cleantech, infotainment,
advanced
materials,
and
other
automotive-related
technologies.310 As of June 2017, GM Ventures had made
thirty-two investments and used almost ninety percent of its

304 CB
INSIGHTS,
THE
STATE
OF
AUTO
TECH
10
(2017),
https://www.cbinsights.com/reports/CB-InsightsAuto-Tech-Trends2017.pdf [perma.cc/XY5R-RQVG].

305

Id.

See Foot on the Gas, supra note 303.
General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 21
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/
000146785817000028/ex-2lx12312016.htm [perma.cc/HC6H-FKX3].
308 Erin Griffith, Driven in the Valley: The Startup Founders Fueling
GM's
Future,
FORTUNE
(Sept.
22,
2016,
6:30
AM),
http://fortune.com/cruise-automation-general-motors-driverless-cars/
[perma.cc/BAN8-QHP6]. Startups don't "adapt well to the politics of slowmoving, risk-averse corporations. Once their life's work begins to feel like
a job, a switch goes off in their brains. Some leave to start their next
company. Others 'vest in peace.' Whatever innovative thing they built gets
lost inside a giant corporate overlord." Id.
309 General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 21
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/
000146785817000028/ex-2lx12312016.htm [perma.cc/HC6H-FKX3].
310 See
About
Us,
GM
VENTURES
L.L.C.,
http://www.gmventures.com/about/index.jsp [perma.cc/2XKY-Y6LS].
306
307
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$200 million fund. 3 11 Under Chesbrough's framework,
General Motors' investments would be characterized as both
enabling and emergent investments. In other words, General
Motors is strategically investing and innovating in areas
that it anticipates will affect the future direction of the
automotive industry. General Motors and its corporate
venture capital arm, GM Ventures, have been the most
active of the automotive manufacturers in making
investments. 31 2 Their investments range from early stage to
late stage, and the fund has eight professionals.3 1 3 General
Motors, like Campbell Soup, also makes investments
directly. 3 14 In January 2016, it served as the sole investor in
a $500 million Series F financing for Lyft.315 In describing its
venture capital investments, General Motors has a line item
for private equity and debt investments 3 16 in its Form 10-K
for the year ended December 31, 2016, which notes $546
million in this category, compared to $529 million for the
31 7 It is
year before-an increase of almost $20 million.
311 There was $14.90 million in dry powder as of June 10, 2017.
https://my-pitchbook-com
PITCHBOOK,
Ventures,
General Motors
/#page/profile1820009183 [perma.cc/4YEZ-NBY4] [hereinafter General
Motors PitchBook Report].
312 Big Auto's Startup Bets, supra note 302.
313 See

id.

But

cf.

About

Us,

GM

VENTURES

L.L.C.,

[perma.cc/4YEZ-NBY4]
http://www.gmventures.com/about/index.jsp
(listing only five investment professionals).
314 See General Motors Company, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q)
(Apr. 21, 2016), at 19, 21, 32, 33, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
2
[perma.cc/
edgar/data/1467858/000146785816000317/gm O16ql.htm
WTR2-7MSL] (noting General Motor's $500 million investment in Lyft).
315 General Motors PitchBook Report, supra note 311.
316 "Private equity and debt investments consist of investments in
private equity and debt funds. These investments provide exposure to and
benefit from long-term equity investments in private companies, including
leveraged buy-outs, venture capital and distressed debt strategies."
General Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2017),
28
/g
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/0001467858170000
m201610k.htm [perma.cc/KH3S-4PJ4] [hereinafter General Motors Form
10-K].
317 See id.
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difficult to ascertain whether GM Ventures is included as
part of that number since there are no specific references to
it. In the "Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements" of
the Form 10-K, there is also a brief reference to venture
capital: "Private equity and debt investments primarily
consist of investments in private equity and debt funds.
These investments provide exposure to and benefit from
long-term equity investments in private companies,
including leveraged buy-outs, venture capital and distressed
debt strategies." 318 References to GM Ventures or venture
capital do not appear anywhere in the 2016 annual or
quarterly reports of General Motors. No references are made
to General Motors' venture capital activities in its proxy
statement either. 3 19 As was the case with Campbell Soup
and Walgreens, information about General Motors' CVC
activity is available in the media and paid resources.
However, in the SEC filings of General Motors itself, very
little is reported. General Motors differs from the other
examples in that it makes CVC investments through both
the parent company and GM Ventures.
This Part discussed CVCs from five different industries at
various stages of development in order to assess how CVC
impacts private ordering in venture capital financings. From
this discussion, three main themes emerged. First, the
investment rhythm of CVCs did not always align with
venture capital funds because it was not motivated by
limited partners or exits. This affects both the staged
financing and exit components of private ordering. Second,
there are potentially more conflicts of interests with CVCs
than venture capital funds because CVCs may invest in the
same space that their parent companies are in. As a result,
the implicit contracts of private ordering may be in jeopardy.
Lastly, the limited information available about CVCs and
the fact that many of them are newcomers may make them
318

Id. at 72.

See General Motors Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Sched. 14A)
(Apr.
22,
2016),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858
/000130817916000367/gm2016_defl4a.htm [perma.cc/ A6DM-47VY].
319
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difficult to assess from a reputation market standpoint of
private ordering. This reputation market would be difficult
to ascertain from both the perspective of the venture capital
fund which may consider syndicating with them and the
entrepreneur who wants to raise money from them.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO CVC CHALLENGES TO
PRIVATE ORDERING
The advent of CVC has complicated the VC landscape.
Because CVCs are not motivated purely by financial gain as
traditional VC firms are, and many may be new to the
startup scene, there will inevitably be growing pains. The
private ordering structure that has worked well for so long
within a two-player system now needs to adapt to
accommodate CVC, which is now an influential third player
in the venture capital landscape.
Part IV addresses the challenges that CVCs pose in
private ordering and proposes possible solutions. One
challenge is that CVCs, particularly ones who are new to VC
investing and have not worked with entrepreneurs or early
stage companies, may adversely impact staged financings
and the ability of the portfolio company to go public or be
acquired. Structuring CVCs in a way that encourages them
to take a closer look at financial considerations is one way to
tackle this issue. A second challenge is conflicts of interest.
This Article recommends increased vigilance and a best
practices framework. Finally, a third challenge is that CVCs
typically do not have the reputation capital that traditional
venture capital firms do. To address this issue, the parent
companies of CVCs can voluntarily disclose more
information about their CVC activities in their public
company filings to earn a reputation for being more
transparent. By offering transparency where none is
required, the parent companies of CVCs can begin to build
trust.
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A. Investment Rhythm and Lack of Exits
Although staged financings are still the norm, CVCsespecially those that are less well-established-tend to
invest in either the earlier or later stages of the company.
CVCs may also come into the deal at unexpected points, like
Intel Capital did with Cloudera, and drive up the valuation
of a company. 32 0 In the case of Cloudera, when the company
went public, it was worth less than it was in its Series F
financing.321 Furthermore, because of their deep pockets,
CVCs may invest more money than expected, which leads to
the problem of private companies staying private longer. 32 2
As this Article points out in various Parts, there is a
growing interest in the innovation that occurs outside of
large corporations. There is a limited amount of R&D that
corporations can do in-house and even when R&D is done
internally, it may languish because of internal politics.
Corporations use their CVC arms to create a pipeline of
potential new acquisition targets or to understand the new
direction of cutting-edge technologies. Therefore, in order to
be accepted as a serious player in the venture capital
ecosystem, new CVCs cannot dabble in investing, but need to
stage their financings to mirror that of successful venture
capital funds.
Additionally, economic realities may push CVCs to act in
a way that follows private ordering principles. Therefore,
although the investments by venture capital funds and CVCs
are now skewed toward early or later stage startups, it is
still staged in that the company raises money, and the
interests of the venture capital fund and CVCs align around
320 See discussion supra Section III.B and accompanying notes for
more information about Intel Capital.
321 See text supra Section III.B about Intel Capital's investment in
Cloudera and the startup's subsequent IPO.
322 "[T]he median time to exit for venture-backed companies is now
8.2 years for an IPO and five years for acquisitions, the highest level in a
decade." Newsletter from Erin Griffith, Senior Writer, Fortune, to
Fortune: Term Sheet subscribers (May 24, 2017, 6:57 AM) (on file with
author).
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the timing of the investment over time. If the entrepreneur
is unable to raise money in the middle stage of the startup's
life cycle, the money to run it may run out, and there will be
a consolidation of the startups that succeed and the ones
that fail-that is simply the nature of this business.
Therefore, from a practical perspective, instead of being
preoccupied about the unevenness of staged financings, the
concerns of portfolio companies will shift to whether to
accept the terms of a down round or the ability to get funding
not only from a CVC but anyone at all. To cite one example,
if unicorns fail to go public or they get too big to acquire, they
will need to succeed as a private company or go out of
business. Even the most highly valued unicorn, Uber,32 3 has
faced problems. It generated severe backlash following its
3 24 its Greyball program, 325
recent litigation with Waymo,
326
and allegations of sexual harassment.
The Unicorn List: Current Private Companies Valued at $1B and
Above, CB INSIGHTS (updated daily), https://www.cbinsights.com/researchunicorn-companies [perma.cc/AK4M-ZUZZ].
324 Complaint, Waymo, LLC v. Uber Technologies Inc., et al.,
No. 3:17-cv-00939, 2017 WL 726994 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017).
325 Greyball is an initiative that "uses data collected from the Uber
app and other techniques to identify and circumvent officials who were
trying to clamp down on the ride-hailing service." Mike Isaac, How Uber
Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greybal-programevade-authorities.html.
326 Biz Carson, An Ex-Uber Employee Claims He Was Fired for
Reporting Sexual Harassment,Bus. INSIDER: TECH. INSIDER (May 18, 2017,
9:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ex-uber-employee-claims-firedYuki
reporting-sexual-harassment-2017-5 [perma.cc/83W6-Y5MJ];
Noguchi, Uber Fires 20 Employees After Sexual Harassment Claim
PM),
6:57
2017,
6,
(June
NPR
Investigation,
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/06/53180689 1/uber-fires20-employees-after-sexual-harassment-claim-investigation
[perma.cc/XG4C-LB6V]; Craig Timberg & Brian Fung, Uber CEO Travis
Kalanick Takes Leave amid Sweeping Changes at the Company, WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the2017),
POST (June 13,
switch/wp/2017/06/13/eric-holder-report-on-harassment-atuber-calls-fornew-corporate-culture/ [perma.cc/TXD2-DWDD]; ERIC HOLDER & TAMMY
323

ALBARRkN,

RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

UBER

(2017),
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Experts also agree that the lack of IPOs and acquisitions
is harmful to the economy. 32 7 CVCs can address this issue by
having frank discussions with their venture capital fund
counterparts to determine if going public or getting acquired
is in the best interest of the various constituencies in the
venture capital deal: the entrepreneur, the venture capital
firm, and the CVC. Granted, CVCs are not focused on exits
because they do not have the pressures of limited partners
who expect a hefty return on their investment through the
investment decisions made by the general partner. However,
this Article suggests-and evidence has shown-that CVCs
can be convinced to allow portfolio companies to go public if
the IPO is a lucrative one (or at least has the promise of
being one, as in the case of Snap).328 The pent-up demand for
IPOs can be used to stimulate exits as well. In order to
increase the number of exits, CVCs should also have similar
compensation structures to venture capital funds so that the
general partners will benefit from an exit in the form of
carried interest. Currently, there are many different legal
structures for CVCs. The most prominent is the single LPowned fund. In reality, ninety-nine percent of the company is
owned by the LP (the parent corporation of the CVC) and the
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3863808/Read-Holder-reportrecommendations-for-Uber.pdf [perma.cc/JVS7-MGX9].
327 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 172.
328 The Snap IPO was initially hailed as a success; it "closed its first
day of trading up 44 percent from its initial offering price of $17." Edmund
Lee, Snap's IPO Was a Success. Now It Has to Prove It's Not Twitter,
RECODE
(Mar.
2,
2017,
4:43
PM),
https://www.recode.net/
2017/3/2/14795366/snaps-ipo-was-a-success
[perma.cc/XG8H-XYV5].
Shortly after, Snap announced a $2.2 billion lost in its first quarter,
causing the value of its shares to drop and potentially sending a warning
signal to other unicorns looking to go public. See Katie Benner, Snap's $2.2
Billion Loss Caps Bumpy FirstMonths as a Public Company, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/technology/snapearnings.html
[perma.cc/7QA9-EME6]; Katie Benner, In Snap Inc.'s Tumble, Start-Ups
See a Warning from Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/technology/snap-public-companystart-ups.html [perma.cc/7C2A-8NBF].
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remaining one percent is owned by the general partners.
However, the fund is commonly referred to as a whollyowned subsidiary. This legal structure is typical of how
venture capital funds are run. In other words, encouraging
carried interest for general partners in CVCs will incentivize
CVCs to take their portfolio companies public and look at
merger and acquisition opportunities. This structure also has
the added benefit of the CVC being able to reinvest any
monies earned into other CVC arms of the parent company
so that like the venture capital funds, there is a cyclical
rhythm to how the money is deployed.
B.

Board Matters

This Article has suggested following a staged financing
model to mimic venture capital funds (albeit in a slightly
skewed form where money is clustered in the early or later
stages of a startup) and considering exit strategies more
seriously. Now, this Article turns to the control element of
private ordering. Under private ordering, there are certain
control mechanisms at work to combat issues of uncertainty
and information asymmetry. This Article argues for more
vigilance regarding the board observer and board seat
arrangements in startups with respect to the control that
CVCs might exert over it through their board designee. It
also sets forth a best practices framework. The suggested
best practices for the boards of startups were made to
address potential conflicts of interest for board members
designated by CVCs and the need for appropriate financial
and industry expertise given the increasing complexities of
startups, which are starting to look more like public
companies that are operating in the private sphere. As
discussed in Part II above, with private companies staying
private longer, in part as a result of increased CVC
investments, getting the correct board mix is more critical
than ever to help ensure that the internal controls and
governance keep pace with the growth of the private
company.
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1. Board Observer
Board observers differ from board members in three
fundamental ways: (1) there are no board voting rights as an
observer, (2) observers can be excluded during certain
discussions, and (3) information rights are contractual. Put
simply, the rights of an observer are limited by the investors'
rights agreement 32 9 and observers do not have fiduciary
duties like board members do.330 The CVC arm is required to
have a certain threshold level of shares for the particular
series of stock it invested in to maintain its observer
rights. 3 3 1 An observer designated by the CVC will receive
notices, minutes, consents, and other materials that are
provided to the portfolio company's directors.332 From a
contractual standpoint, the board observer designated by the
CVC may, but typically does not, agree to act as a board
member would (essentially agreeing to be bound to the same
fiduciary duties as board members), and the portfolio
company maintains the right to decide whether to exclude
such board observer from certain meetings for reasons
related to attorney-client privilege, disclosure of trade
secrets, or conflict of interest. 333 Additionally, the portfolio
329

See

NAT'L VENTURE

CAPITAL ASS'N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS,

INVESTOR RIGHTS AGREEMENT 22-23, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-

documents/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
330 Sometimes companies choose to include such provisions in a
management rights letter signed between the company and the particular
investor receiving such rights. See id. at 23 n.35. A company may also
request that board observers execute confidentiality agreements since they
are not subject to the same fiduciary duties as directors. See id.
331 See id. at 22.
332

See id.

333 The relevant language in the investors' rights agreement states:
[S]uch representative shall agree to hold in confidence and
trust and to act in a fiduciary manner with respect to all
information so provided; and provided further, that the
Company reserves the right to withhold any information
and to exclude such representative from any meeting or
portion thereof if access to such information or attendance
at such meeting could adversely affect the attorney-client
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company could choose to exclude the board observer
designated by the CVC if the CVC's parent is a competitor of
33 4
the portfolio company.
From a best practices standpoint, it would behoove the
CVC to designate a board observer from a corporate venture
capital arm that is a subsidiary instead of a corporate
venture unit that is part of the parent company. Regardless
of whether a board observer is designated by the CVC that is
a subsidiary of the parent company or a corporate unit of the
parent company, CVCs should implement appropriate
internal confidentiality procedures for such board observers
to prevent them from disregarding contractual confidential
provisions with portfolio companies and sharing such
confidential information broadly within the parent company.
CVCs should also disclose any potential conflicts early to
ensure that proper board procedure can be followed-i.e.,
CVC-designated board observers leave the board discussion
for a certain portion of the meeting-to prevent any hint of
impropriety.
Although CVCs have designated more board observers in
the past, the current trend is for many of them to designate
board members. 33 5 Ultimately, however, the role such
individuals play-whether as a board observer or board
member-depends on the philosophy of the CVC arm of the
public company and the amount of money it invests in the
startup. To cite some examples, when American Express
privilege between the Company and its counsel or result in
disclosure of trade secrets or a conflict of interest, or if such
Investor or its representative is a competitor of the
Company.
Id. at 22-23.
334 See id.
335 The top ten CVCs-the top ten being denoted by a CB Insights
article--often take an active board position in the private companies they
invest in (versus a more passive board position, such as "board observer").
For example, Intel Capital has sixty-four board member seats out of 154
total current board positions. Intel Capital PitchBook Report, supra note
258. GV has seventy-five board member seats out of eighty-two current
board positions. GVPitchBook Report, supra note 222.
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Ventures participates on a board, it typically designates a
board observer. 33 6 Intel Capital, in contrast, is much more
likely to designate a board member. 33 7
2. Board Member
Board members designated by CVCs are bound to certain
fiduciary duties by statute. 3 38 These include the duty of
loyalty339 and the duty of care. 340 There are also other

336 See American Express Ventures, PITCHBOOK, https://my-pitchbookcom/#page/profile_567803052.
337 Under the section titled 'Top 25 Board Seats" in the PitchBook
report, Intel Capital had board observer status in only seven of the
twenty-five seats; the other eighteen were all board memberships. See
Intel CapitalPitchBook Report, supranote 258.
338 Specifically, this refers to the statutory law of the state of
incorporation of the company that the CVCs are investing in. For example,
if the company is incorporated in Delaware, board powers are codified in
section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE tit.
8, § 141 (2016).
339 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
("Essentially, the duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any interest
possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared
by the stockholders generally."); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)
("Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of

trust and confidence to further their private interests .... The rule that

requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.").
340 In Delaware, the duty of care is not codified, but has been
developed in case law, and is separate from the duty of loyalty. See Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) ("[A] director's duty to
exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care,
as distinguished from a duty of loyalty."). Under the duty of care, directors
have a responsibility to "inform themselves, prior to making a business
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. Having
become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the
discharge of their duties." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
(holding that the duty of care is integral to application of the business
judgment rule), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244 (Del. 2000).
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disclosure, 34 2 and
faith,341
such as good
duties,
343 which CVCs should also bear in mind. 344
confidentiality,
Another way to address potential conflicts of interest that
may arise in the board context in the event that a CVC has
the right to designate a board member is for the CVC
to designate an individual not affiliated with the CVC arm in
any way. Instead, the CVC may designate one of its coinvestors in the syndicate to serve as a board member. Using
this tactic would serve two purposes: (1) it would ease any
concerns by entrepreneurs about potential competition from
the CVC, and (2) the CVC still maintains its right to
designate a board member. In order for this to work,
however, it would take a high degree of trust between the
CVC investor and traditional VC firm investor.
341 The key difference between good faith in the fiduciary duty context
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Uniform
Commercial Code context is temporal-the courts analyze the parties'
actions at the time of the alleged wrongdoing and review what happened
in the past to determine the parties' relationship when the breach
occurred in the case of the former. With respect to an implied covenant
claim, the courts examine the time the contract was made and whether the
parties would have made the decisions they did if the issue discussed arose
at that time. Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 57 A3d 400, 418 (Del.
2013); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67
(Del. 2006).
342 See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A-2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985).
343 See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997)
(holding that under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, "a
fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to
purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and
confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that
information"); S.E.C. v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2001)
(reaffirming that the duty of confidentiality, in the context of securities
laws, exists "where there is explicit acceptance of a duty of confidentiality
or where such acceptance may be implied from a similar relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties")).
344 Under Delaware law, board members may choose to be a nonvoting member. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(d) (2016) ('"f the certificate of
incorporation provides that 1 or more directors shall have more or less
than 1 vote per director on any matter .. ").
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Board members designated by CVCs are not there to
represent the interest of the parent company. Instead, they
have legal fiduciary duties to all of the portfolio company's
stockholders, and not to the parent company. While this is
certainly a conflict for board members appointed by
traditional VC firms, it is a much bigger issue for CVCs
where the parent's corporate interests may be misaligned.
i. Duty of Care
By reviewing board materials carefully, advocating for
deliberate review of board actions, voicing support for
ongoing review of financial controls, seeking the advice and
counsel of other experts as needed, 345 and ensuring the
accuracy of board minutes and written board actions, a CVC
board designee can discharge his or her duty of care. 346
345 Id. § 141(e). Note that the standard of gross negligence is applied if
a board is alleged to breach this particular duty. In re Citigroup Inc.
S'holder Derivative Litig., 964, A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009). In order to
succeed on a claim of breach of duty of care against an individual, the
plaintiff must rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule as to
the majority of the directors. Hamilton Partners, L.P. v. Highland Capital
Mgmt., L.P., C.A. No. 6547-VCN, 2014 WL 1813340 (Del. Ch. May 7,
2014). The court will apply the more stringent standard of entire fairness
(where the burden shifts to the board of directors to prove the principles of
fair dealing and fair price) in certain circumstances. See Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A-3d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
346 If there is a good faith effort to discharge the duty of care, then the
business judgment rule applies. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984). If there is not a good faith effort then a more stringent standard
applies, such as the entire fairness standard. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993). The duty of care focuses more on
process than substance. See, e.g., In re Trados, 73 A-3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(in which the court scrutinized the actions of the board of directors in a
merger action). Note that even if directors breach the duty of care, there is
a statutory limitation of liability for directors under section 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law (which only exculpates directors
not anyone else). DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2016). Furthermore, there
are indemnification statutes, such as the one codified in Delaware's
General Corporation Law section 145, which allows corporations to
indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a
party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding,
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Recent court cases out of the Delaware Court of Chancery
highlight the need to abide by the duty of care.3 47 For
example, in In re Rural Metro Corp.,348 the opinion
illustrates the need for active and engaged directors in any
sale process, which includes taking steps to ensure that all
conflicts are identified, disclosed, and discussed. 34 9 Directors
must be proactive in asking questions about any existing
potential conflicts, the implications of such conflicts, and how
they will be addressed.3 50 Put simply, directors must focus
35
on the process of making a decision. 1

whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative (other than an
action by or in the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that the
person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation
and permits corporations to insure their directors in the event of a breach
of duty of care. Id. § 145(a).
347 As alluded to in the discussion in supra note 346, even though
directors are exculpated pursuant to the section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, financial advisors can still be liable for aiding
and abetting a breach of the duty of care by the directors. See In re Rural
Metro Corp. (Rural Metro), 88 A.3d 54, 85-86 (Del. Ch. 2014).
348 In Rural Metro, the court found that if a "third party knows that
the board is breaching its duty of care and participates in the breach by
misleading the board or creating the informational vacuum, then the third
party can be liable for aiding and abetting." Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97.
349 Id. at 105-06.
350 See id.
351 By focusing on the process of making decisions, directors exercise
their fiduciary duty of care. "Directors should:
"
*
"
*
*
*

be active and engaged;
obtain access to relevant information;
obtain input from relevant board committees and
board advisors;
actively deliberate decisions, asking relevant questions
and discussing the information provided;
examine available alternatives; and
resist the pressure for a quick decision."

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, WSGR ALERT: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR

OF DIRECTORS 1 (2011), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/
[perma.cc/
PDFSearclwsgralert-board-of-directors-critical-issues.pdf
BK4Z-RDNL].
BOARDS
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In the case of CVCs, one example of a potential conflict of
interest occurs when the startup directly competes with the
parent company of the CVC. If that is the case, then the CVC
board designee needs to identify the conflict, disclose the
nature of the conflict, and discuss appropriate next steps. If
the startup is contemplating the parent company as a
potential acquirer, the CVC board designee must recuse
herself from the decision-making process. Even if the parent
company is not a possible buyer, the CVC-designated board
member has a conflict if potential buyers are competitors of
the parent company. The board minutes of the startup
should reflect a clear record of the discussions that
transpired, including a careful review of the facts, steps it
took to make the decision, and the decision that the board
made as a result of that deliberation. By taking these steps,
the board demonstrates a good faith effort to discharge its
duty of care, as defined above. As a result, should
stockholders decide to sue the company, the company will be
subject to the standard of the business judgment rule (where
the onus is on the stockholder to prove wrongdoing) instead
of the more stringent standard of entire fairness. 352
A director may be unable to fulfill his or her duty of care
in any meaningful way depending on the number of boards
on which he or she serves, since serving on a board of a
private company typically means that board members meet
at least once a quarter if not monthly. Therefore, setting a
limit on the number of boards on which a person can serve
would be prudent, especially if a CVC arm of a public
company is big and active like GV is. As the corporate
venture capital arm of a public company continues to grow, it
may entail hiring more investment professionals.
ii. Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty involves protecting confidential
information and communications by establishing clear

352

See discussion supra note 346.
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3 53
procedures, being aware of potential conflicts of interests
for the CVC designee or other directors or their affiliates,
and ensuring the disclosure of all material facts regarding a
particular transaction. Furthermore, interested directors
(whether the CVC designees or others) should limit their
participation in deliberations or voting regarding a
transaction. The applicable Delaware statute3 54 does not
necessitate the recusal of an interested director provided
that certain conditions are met, including disclosure of the
material facts by the director regarding his or her
relationship or interest to the board of directors or committee
and the stockholders entitled to vote on the matter. 35 5 In
addition, the contract must be fair to the corporation at the
time it is approved by the board, committee, or
stockholders. 356
The CVC world is especially rife with conflict because, in
many cases, the parent companies of the CVCs are very
involved in their management. The board designees from
CVCs must make decisions in the best interest of all
stockholders in the company and not solely in the interests of
the parent companies of the CVCs. This can be a difficult
line to toe, especially given the various legal ways in which
CVCs are structured. For example, if CVCs are part of a

353 If there is a conflict of interest in the context of a board decision or
transaction, directors are not protected by the business judgment rule and
liability would not be limited by statute. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2016). Note that conflicts of interest can arise whether the individual
director has a personal interest or not, such as in the case of a CVC board
designee who is not serving the interest of the parent company on the
board but rather owes a duty to all stockholders of the company.
354 See id. § 144.
355 See id. § 144(a)(1), (2). Historically, many firms have advised that
a conflicted board member should be recused from voting, but the author
has had conversations with attorneys practicing in this area that they
have increasingly seen Delaware lawyers advising that even conflicted
board members should vote so long as there is full disclosure.
356 See id. § 144(a)(3).
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business unit, as is the case with General Mills,357 the board
designees of such CVCs are employed by the parent
companies. In contrast, in the case of CVCs which are
wholly-owned subsidiaries of parent companies but with
some level of independent decision-making, there may be a
layer of autonomy that does not exist when a CVC directly
reports to the parent company in some way. Therefore,
although in theory board designees of CVCs should represent
the interests of all stockholders of the private companies in
which they invest, CVC board designees may only be
considering the one that pays the bills-the parent
companies of the CVCs.
Despite the potential for conflicts of interest, however,
there are still good reasons for the entrepreneurs who are
receiving investments from CVCs to have CVC-designated
board members. Because board members have fiduciary
duties, the entrepreneurs can use those duties as a tool if
CVCs behave badly. For example, if a CVC realizes that its
portfolio company poses a fundamental business threat to its
parent
company, the CVC board
designee
could
hypothetically vote to shutter the company thereby
potentially acting against the interest of the stockholders of
the company. At that point, the entrepreneurs and the
company's legal counsel could remind the CVC that they
have fiduciary duties that require them to act in the interest
of all stockholders. If they fail to adhere to such duties, they
will increase their chances of being subject to lawsuits in the
future.
C.

The Reputation Market

A third challenge with CVCs is that throughout their
history they have generally been looked upon with disdain
and suspicion by venture capital funds and, to a lesser
extent, entrepreneurs as well. This makes it difficult for
CVCs to meet the reputational aspects of private ordering.
357 See discussion supra Section III.C and accompanying notes (briefly
describing the structure of General Mills' corporate venture capital arm).
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Although the life spans of CVCs have lengthened over
time, historically they have had shorter life spans than their
venture capital fund counterparts. Accordingly, CVCs may
not have a track record of VC deals from which either
entrepreneurs or. venture capital funds can analyze to
determine whether they would be good partners in a
financing. Also, unlike successful venture capital funds,
where the success of one fund has an iterative effect and
makes it easier to fundraise for future funds, CVCs are
dependent on their parent companies to continue funding
their portfolio companies. Lastly, if a CVC has only recently
joined the VC landscape, its reputation may be based on
what this Article will characterize as a "reputational halo
effect" that originates from the brand of the parent company.
This reputational halo effect may be both good and bad. For
example, a CVC could cultivate the reputation of being an
advocate for entrepreneurs by having it more widely known
that it leverages its parent companies' extensive networks
and infrastructure to help them. At the same time, however,
no matter what the brand of the company, big companies are
generally viewed as slow moving and bureaucratic and this
perception could then be attributed to CVCs. This, in turn,
leads to the notion that CVCs are difficult to work with or do
not have a vested interest in seeing the entrepreneur succeed
because their performance has an insignificant impact on the
parent company's bottom line.
The fact that there is very little to no available
information about CVCs available also compounds the
challenges with the reputation market. This lack of
information makes it extremely difficult to assess what kind
of monetary and non-monetary contributions CVCs provide.
Under the current requirements of Regulation S-K and
Regulation S-X, public companies that make CVC
investments disclose the information in ways that are not
transparent.358 For example, the information about
corporate venture capital is referenced in the notes to

358

See 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229 (2017).
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consolidated financial statements or obliquely referenced in
the management's discussion and analysis or risk factors
section. In fact, entrepreneurs may rely on the media's
interpretation of the limited information that is available.
For example, in the case of Campbell Soup Company, one of
the five case studies discussed in Section III.C supra, media
reports largely disclosed, in the first instance, its CVC
activity through Acre Venture Partners. 359
There are three possible ways to combat this lack of
information about CVCs that is critical to making a
reputational assessment. The entrepreneur should ask for
(1) the amount of assets under management; (2) the amount
of money that the CVCs have left to invest (i.e., dry powder);
(3) the total number of investments (while also noting which
ones are active); (4) how many board positions (either on the
board or as a board observer) the investment professional of
the CVC holds; (5) the investment preferences of the CVC
fund; and (6) recent investments of the CVC. The
information that this Article advocates for is already
available-just not to everyone and not in any consistent
manner. Resources like PitchBook are available for a fee that
startups may not be able to afford. At the very least,
however, entrepreneurs should seek this information in
making decisions about potential investors when there is not
information about them in the marketplace. In this way, the
fifth prong of private ordering-implicit contracts regarding
the reputation market-can be met.
Second, the parent companies of the CVCs can voluntarily
disclose information about their CVC activities. Although
this type of disclosure is not required under law, it helps
CVCs-particularly those that are not as well-known as Intel
Capital or GV-to build a reputation for transparency. This
transparency in turn may create a sense of trustworthiness.
In their public company filings, the parent companies of
CVCs may choose to include information ranging from the
amount allocated to the CVC to which companies they are

359 See discussion supra Section

HI.C and accompanying notes.
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investing in to how many board seats or board observer roles
each investment professional has. For example, in Forms 10K360 and 10-Q, 3 6 1 the information about a public company's
CVC activities-whether forming a CVC or investing in
private companies or serving on the board of a private
company-can be made in Items I. Business and IA. Risk
Factors. Under Item 8.01 Other Events of the Form 8-K, the
public company may disclose "information.. .not otherwise
called for by this form, that the [public company] deems of
importance to security holders."3 62 In this way, potential and
current investors as well as employees can get a better grasp
on what CVCs do and how big a role they play in their
parent company. This information has the added benefit of
being helpful to startups who may be considering
investments from the public companies who are making CVC
investments.
Although not required under Regulation S-X, in the notes
to financial statements, the parent company could break
down equity investments in private companies in a way that
is clear and understandable. For example, if equity
investments are grouped under "Other Long-Term Assets,"
which include both debt and equity investments, then that
information needs to be broken out to describe what portion
constitutes debt as compared to equity. In part, recently
issued accounting pronouncements not yet adopted, such as
Accounting Standards Update No. 2016-01 ("ASU 201601"),363 may provide additional information for startups as
well.

See Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuantto Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formlO-k.pdf [perma.cc/W9NL-4SWA].
COMM'N,
EXCH.
&
SEC.
1O-Q,
Form
361 See
http://www.sec. gov/about/forms/form 1-q.pdf [perma.cc/PX4A-6BH8].
362 See Form 8-K, Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [perma.cc/72PX-ZU3Y].
360
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Third, entrepreneurs seeking venture capital money can
also perform due diligence on CVC investors through the
venture capital fund with which they partner with. These
funds will have knowledge of how CVC-designated board
members act in situations where there are conflicts of
interest if the CVC has participated in VC financings in the
past. Even if the venture capital fund does not have such
knowledge of the CVC, it has the ability to reach out to its
network to get more information.
CONCLUSION
CVCs are playing an increasingly important role in
venture capital financings. In order to ensure that the
current venture capital structure works within the private
ordering framework, CVCs may need to assess what aspects
of venture capital funds they wish to adapt to and which
parts of their role in the venture capital investing cycle will
remain uniquely theirs.
The fourth wave of CVC is not over yet. As the newest
CVCs mature it would be helpful to look at their impact on
private ordering over a longer time period. In particular, this
Article urges that any future study of CVCs examine how
CVC board designees address conflicts of interest. As this
Article has suggested, CVCs and their parent companies
must strive to institute a set of best practices that will better
serve the private companies they invest in and lead to more
productive relationships with the venture capital funds with
which they invest.

FINANCIAL LABILITIES (2016), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/
DocumentPage?cid= 1176167762170 [perma.ccl4C2F-R3A2].

